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 HIGH-TECH VIEW: THE USE OF 
IMMERSIVE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS IN 
JURY TRIALS 
CARRIE LEONETTI* 
JEREMY BAILENSON** 
You‘ve got to be careful if you don‘t know where you‘re 
going ‘cause you might not get there! 
Yogi Berra
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A trial, at its essence, is a process through which attorneys re-create the 
image of a real-life event or circumstance and apply to the resulting factual 
picture certain rules of law.  Traditionally, during trial, abstract factual 
material, such as material relating to state of mind, authority, responsibility, or 
cause and effect, has been expressed verbally, through witness testimony, 
rather than visually.  Increasingly, however, as technology has progressed, 
graphic images have played a greater role in communicating this information 
that was traditionally imparted by words alone.
2
 
Much has been written on a variety of legal issues stemming from the 
advancement of virtual-reality (VR) technology,
3
 from the rights of players, 
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1. THE YOGI BOOK: ―I REALLY DIDN‘T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID!‖ 102 (1998). 
2. According to a University of California study, in 1999, 93% of all information generated was 
generated in digital form on computers, rather than in other media, like paper.  See In re Bristol-
Myers Squibb Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 437, 440 n.2 (D.N.J. 2002). 
3. See, e.g., BENJAMIN TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTUAL LAW 4 (2008).  ―Virtual reality‖ generally 
refers to the interface between the user and the computer-based simulated environment.  Id.  The 
term ―virtual reality‖ was coined by Jaron Lanier.  See Jaron Lanier, Virtually There, SCI. AM., Apr. 
2001, at 66, 68. 
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users, and avatars in virtual worlds,
4
 end-user license agreements and terms of 
service,
5
 virtual property and contract rights,
6
 intellectual property law and 
virtual worlds,
7
 suing fictitious defendants in virtual worlds,
8
 virtual torts,
9
 
virtual crimes,
10
 virtual privacy rights,
11
 the taxation of virtual currency,
12
 and 
freedom of expression in virtual reality,
13
 to the reliability and authenticity of 
evidence collected in a virtual world
14
 and the authenticity and admissibility 
of digital evidence.
15
  This Article attempts to address a different question: 
whether immersive-virtual-environment (IVE) technology
16
 could be designed 
for and used during a jury trial.
17
 
The benefit of using visual media in a jury trial is that, unlike words in 
witness testimony, visual media are a richer means of communication, which 
permit multiple coded items of information to be transmitted and absorbed at 
one time and result in a direct image being transmitted through associations to 
a jury.
18
  Visual media can furnish an avenue of continual communication by 
 
4. DURANSKE, supra note 3, at 23–26. 
5. Id. at 27–30. 
6. Id. at 117–37. 
7. Id. at 139–62. 
8. Id. at 166–67. 
9. Id. at 177–79. 
10. Id. at 197–207. 
11. Id. at 211–12. 
12. Id. at 225–40. 
13. See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in 
Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141 (2008) (discussing the First Amendment implications of 
virtual reality). 
14. DURANSKE, supra note 3, at 52–54. 
15. See GEORGE L. PAUL, FOUNDATIONS OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE 14–15 (2008). 
16. For a primer on the definition and types of IVE technology, see generally Jeremy N. 
Bailenson et al., Courtroom Applications of Virtual Environments, Immersive Virtual Environments, 
and Collaborative Virtual Environments, 28 LAW & POL‘Y 249 (2006). 
17. Several commentators have also written about the admissibility of computer-generated 
animations, which are, in a sense, a type of VR, but which employ fixed, rather than interactive, 
immersive virtual environments.  See, e.g., I. Neel Chatterjee, Admitting Computer Animations: More 
Caution and New Approach Are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36 (1995); Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of 
Computer-Generated Visual Evidence in Aviation Litigation: Interactive Video Comes To Court, 55 
J. AIR L. & COM. 839 (1990); Dean A. Morande, A Class of Their Own: Model Procedural Rules and 
Evidentiary Evaluation of Computer-Generated “Animations,” 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069 (2007). 
18. See generally ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL (3d ed. 1997) (discussing jurors‘ beliefs on eyewitness testimony and factors 
determining perception); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE 
14–30 (1991) (documenting the ―Magic of the Mind‖); EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Loftus eds., 1984) (documenting how word choice and 
the use of images effect how juries perceive information); Stephen M. Kosslyn et al., Visual Images 
Preserve Metric Spatial Information: Evidence from Studies of Image Scanning, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 47, 57–59 (1978) (finding that human subjects 
scanned a mental image of an object in their minds in the same manner and at roughly the same 
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a party with the jury.  Visual media are also infinitely faster, more efficient, 
and more accurate than merely verbal presentations.
19
  Visual media can be 
far more potent and persuasive than other types of evidence.
20
  Studies show 
that jurors recollect approximately 85% of what they see but only 15% of 
what they hear.
21
 
VR technology, and more specifically IVE, is one such type of visual 
media.  An IVE is an artificial, interactive, computer-created scene or ―world‖ 
within which a user can immerse herself.
22
  IVEs combine high-resolution, 
stereoscopic projection and three-dimensional computer graphics to create a 
complete sense of presence in a virtual environment.
23
  IVEs consist of 
immersion in an artificial environment in which the users feel just as 
perceptually surrounded as they do in ―reality.‖24  IVEs produce a simulated 
 
speed that they scanned the original visual object). 
19. See Robert F. Seltzer, Evidence and Exhibits at Trial, in PRACTISING LAW INST., 
PREPARATION & TRIAL OF A TOXIC TORT CASE 1990, at 371, 373 (1990); Robert Seltzer, Effective 
Communication: Seeing Is Believing, in PRACTISING LAW INST., PRODUCT LIABILITY OF 
MANUFACTURERS 1988, at 597, 599 (1988). 
20. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–86 (2007) (holding that a police officer did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment when he deliberately rammed his patrol car into that of a fleeing 
motorist, paralyzing him, during a high-speed chase, and finding that the officer‘s use of deadly force 
was justified by the risk that the motorist‘s driving posed based largely on a video of the chase 
recorded by a dashboard camera in the officer‘s car); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You 
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 
842 (2009) (finding that video evidence creates a danger of ―decisionmaking hubris‖ in court 
proceedings).  But see Maryanne Garry & Matthew P. Gerrie, When Photographs Create False 
Memories, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI. 321, 322–23 (2005) (arguing that text can be as, 
if not more, powerful than images because text allows an individual to actively elaborate on details 
about the words, while images permit an individual to passively absorb details). 
Japanese roboticist Mori cautioned in a 1970 essay about the danger of creating human-like 
robots.  Jun‘ichiro Seyama & Ruth S. Nagayama, The Uncanny Valley: Effect of Realism on the 
Impression of Artificial Human Faces, 16 PRESENCE: TELEOPERATORS & VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 
337, 337 (2007).  Mori created a graph that illustrates viewer responses to robots as they become 
more human-looking.  Id. at 338.  His chart shows that, as robots become more human-looking, there 
is a point at which ―they stop being likeable and instead become eerie, frightening, repulsive—
‗uncanny.‘‖  Tom Geller, Overcoming the Uncanny Valley, 28 IEEE COMPUTER GRAPHICS & 
APPLICATIONS 11 (2008).  At this point, the viewer‘s sensation becomes uneasy, and the human 
response dips into ―the uncanny valley.‖  Id.  For an in-depth and thorough analysis of the uncanny 
valley, see Tom Geller‘s article on overcoming the valley.  Id.; see also John Mangan, When Fantasy 
Is Just Too Close for Comfort, Age on the Web, June 10, 2007, 
http://www.theage.com.au/news/entertainment/when-fantasy-is-just-too-close-for-comfort/2007/06/ 
09/1181089394400.html?page=fullpage (discussing the uncanny valley, animation, and film).  Once 
the robot‘s appearance becomes perfectly human-looking, the viewer‘s response increases and is no 
longer in the uncanny valley.  See Geller, supra, at 12. 
21. See Seltzer, Evidence and Exhibits at Trial, supra note 19, at 373; Seltzer, Effective 
Communication, supra note 19, at 599. 
22. See Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 251–53. 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
1076 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1073 
yet interactive reality in real time, which can support spatialized sound and 
virtual touch.
25
  In an IVE, a participant‘s awareness of physical self is 
diminished or lost by being surrounded in the engrossing total artificial 
environment.
26
  Common examples of IVEs are certain computer games, 
training programs such as flight and driving simulators, and immersive and 
interactive art installations.
27
 
One advantage of VR technology is that it enables a litigant, before the 
jury, to simulate a particular experience, demonstrate and test subjective 
perspective,
28
 and probe the structure and capacity of memory by 
manipulating assumptions about variables like sequence and spatial 
relationships.
29
  As has been previously documented, VR technology can be 
designed for use in the courtroom, to re-create crime scenes, impeach the 
testimony of unreliable witnesses, test assertions, and enhance a jury‘s 
understanding of disputed events in computer-based simulated 
environments.
30
  Because IVEs are digital, their data can be stored 
indefinitely, making it possible for courts to archive VR models to create a 
database of reusable locations and individuals.
31
 
The power of an IVE, however, can be a double-edged sword.  On the one 
hand, an IVE could equip a jury with a better understanding of the material 
facts at issue.  On the other hand, the immersive, interactive, and fluid 
character of an IVE gives rise to a risk of manipulation or undue influence 
upon the jury, which may be swept up in the experiential nature of VR.
32
  
Because VR models project an image of certainty and completeness through 
 
25. See id. at 251. 
26. See id. at 251–53. 
27. See id. at 251–54. 
28. See id. at 254–58. 
29. See id.  The user, in this case a juror, enters the IVE by using an ―avatar,‖ which is a visual 
representation of herself that can interact with other users and the environment.  DURANSKE, supra 
note 3, at 7. 
30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
31. See Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 251. 
32. See id. at 263–64; cf. Lloyd P. Rieber, Animation, Incidental Learning, and Continuing 
Motivation, 83 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 318, 326 (1991) (finding that individuals not only remember and 
learn effectively from computer animation, they also assume information beyond what animations 
purport to teach).  However, it could result instead in the ―Christmas tree phenomenon,‖ i.e., jurors 
will be so dazzled by the ―pretty lights‖ of a new visual technology that they will not adequately 
consider the other evidence explaining or contradicting it.  See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and 
Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, in LAW, MIND, AND BRAIN 
23, 42 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009). 
Some commentators argue that depictions from certain angles can present a biased view of an 
event because the visual images from multiple perspectives leave less time for analysis of each 
individual event and present a quality of liveness that may not depict all relevant facets of the 
accompanying testimony.  See KENNETH B. HUGHES & BENJAMIN J. CANTOR, PHOTOGRAPHS IN 
CIVIL LITIGATION 206 (1973). 
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the clarity of their representations, they can create a distorted aura of 
reliability for a jury. 
The use of an IVE during a jury trial could have profound implications for 
the manner in which lawyers present facts during trial.  An IVE could be a 
powerful alternative approach to recreating scenes (the configuration of 
streets, driveways, buildings), episodes or events (appearances, sizes, and 
shapes), and abstract factual material (trends, relationships) as visual images 
rather than as strings of spoken or written text.
33
  For example, in an IVE, 
jurors could view a crime scene or the scene of an accident from the 
perspective of a witness or a party and manipulate the digital assets to test the 
credibility of that perspective.
34
  By using an IVE during cross-examination, 
an attorney could illustrate for the jury the limitations of a witness‘s capacity 
to have observed the events about which he is testifying. 
In general, trial courts enjoy a great deal of latitude in admitting 
demonstrative evidence and controlling the form and manner of its 
presentation,
35
 and the rules of evidence apply to VR evidence in the same 
way that they apply to other types of evidence.  It is the foundation for the 
admission of VR evidence that may be different.
36
  There is little question that 
a party could introduce a fixed VR simulation in evidence, as demonstrative 
evidence or an illustrative aide,
37
 as long as such party could make the 
 
33. Cognitive-science literature suggests that human beings have the ability to retain no more 
than a few pieces of information in their short-term memories.  See, e.g., George A. Miller, The 
Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing 
Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 86 (1956).  The volume of information that an individual can 
recall, therefore, is largely a function of the size and content of the individual pieces.  See id. 
34. Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 256–58.  Such technology is already being developed.  
See, e.g., Celeste Biever, Courtrooms Could Host Virtual Crime Scenes, NewScientist, Mar. 10, 
2005, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7130&print=true (describing new software, 
instant Scene Modeler, that can re-create an interactive, three-dimensional virtual crime scene from a 
few hundred frames of a scene captured by a special video camera). 
35. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (directing courts to exercise reasonable control over the mode of 
presentation of evidence to make the presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth and to 
avoid needless consumption of time); Meurling v. County Transp. Co., 230 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 
1956); State v. Feaster, 716 A.2d 395, 436 (N.J. 1998). 
36. See generally PAUL, supra note 15. 
37. There are two primary conceptual classes of trial demonstrations: (1) demonstrative 
materials that are admitted as substantive evidence to prove a fact in the case, and (2) illustrative aids 
to testimony (―chalks‖).  See Morande, supra note 17, at 1072–73.  Demonstrative exhibits are 
objects that directly convey relevant information from or of themselves—for example, a crime scene 
photograph.  Illustrative aids are visual representations of a witness‘s testimony, which do not 
themselves provide bases for inferences, but merely facilitate the conveying of information by the 
witness, who is the true source of the information—for example, a witness‘s illustration of the crime 
scene drawn to assist the jury in following the witness‘s testimony about directions, distances, and 
relative positions.  See id.  Demonstrative or illustrative evidence may be evidence that replicates the 
original physical evidence, demonstrates some matter material to the case, or illustrates specific 
aspects of an expert‘s opinion testimony.  Id.  Demonstrative evidence must satisfy specific tests of 
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necessary foundational showing of authenticity, relevancy, and reliability 
prior to its admission into evidence.
38
  The more interesting question, and the 
subject of this Article, is whether the rules of evidence permit either a party or 
the court itself to employ an IVE during a jury trial—in other words, to permit 
the jurors to don VR gear and enter an immersive simulation of the scene of a 
crime or accident.
39
 
 
admissibility (such as relevancy and authenticity), but, once in evidence, it can be directly relied 
upon by the jury.  See FED. R. EVID. 104.  To use a VR model as demonstrative evidence, a litigant 
would have to establish its accuracy and trustworthiness.  See United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 
889, 893 n.11 (9th Cir. 1969): 
While . . . it is immaterial that the business record is maintained in a 
computer rather than in company books, this is on the assumption that: (1) the 
opposing party is given the same opportunity to inquire into the accuracy of the 
computer and the input procedures used, as he would have to inquire into the 
accuracy of written business records, and (2) the trial court, as in the case of 
challenged business records, requires the party offering the computer 
information to provide a foundation therefor sufficient to warrant a finding that 
such information is trustworthy. 
Id.; see also 14 AM. JUR. 2D PROOF OF FACTS § 17 (1977) (―The most common reason that courts 
have rejected computerized evidence is that an insufficient foundation was laid to show the accuracy 
and trustworthiness of the evidence.‖). 
38. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Pa. 2006) (permitting the 
Commonwealth to present a computer-generated animation as demonstrative evidence to illustrate 
the expert opinions of its forensic pathologist and crime scene reconstructionist as to how a fatal 
shooting allegedly occurred as long as the Commonwealth was able to properly authenticate its 
animated exhibit as a fair and accurate depiction of its experts‘ reconstruction of the relevant crime 
and the final version of the videotape animation did not include any inflammatory features that could 
cause unfair prejudice). 
39. There are two ways that a jury could enter an IVE simulating the scene—through a court-
appointed expert or through an expert witness retained by one or more of the parties to the case to 
construct an IVE and testify to sufficient foundation prior to ―publishing‖ the IVE to the jury.  Trial 
courts have the discretion to appoint their own, impartial experts.  See FED. R. EVID. 614 (permitting 
the court to call and interrogate witnesses); FED. R. EVID. 706 (codifying the court‘s inherent 
authority to appoint expert witnesses of its own selection on its own motion); Reilly v. United States, 
863 F.2d 149, 154–56 (1st Cir. 1988) (recognizing that trial courts have the inherent authority to 
appoint technical advisors to assist them); Danville Tobacco Ass‘n v. Bryant-Buckner Assocs., 333 
F.2d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 1964) (recognizing the inherent power of a trial court to appoint an expert of 
its own choosing); Scott ex rel. Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1962) (same); 
Commonwealth v. Correa, 648 A.2d 1199, 1201 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that the trial court 
had inherent authority to appoint an expert); 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 367 (2d ed. 1994); CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE STANDARDS § 6 
(2007) (recognizing that trial judges have the inherent authority to appoint expert technical advisors 
and witnesses) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].  Provisions governing the appointment of court 
experts comparable to those contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence exist in most states.  See, 
e.g., PA. R. EVID. 614 (permitting the court to call and interrogate witnesses); PA. R. EVID. 706 
(delineating the procedure that a court must follow if it appoints an expert witness).  If the court 
appoints its own VR expert, it could permit the parties to provide information to its VR expert for use 
in constructing the IVE.  See ABA STANDARDS, supra, § 6(d) (suggesting guidelines for 
communication between parties and a court-appointed expert). 
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The immersive nature of IVEs can seem foreign in the context of the 
American adversary judicial system.  Nonetheless, the use of an IVE during 
trial is not without precedent; in fact, it is probably inevitable.  IVEs fit within 
the traditional framework of jury trials in two primary and interrelated ways: 
first, as the next step in technological development of visual media that began 
with drawings and photographs and has progressed to videotape and computer 
animations and simulations, and second, as an improved, but functional 
equivalent, of a jury scene-viewing. 
This Article makes both empirical and normative claims about the 
admissibility of IVE evidence during a jury trial.  The empirical claim is that 
IVE evidence will inevitably enter the American courtroom; the normative 
one is that this inevitable entrance is a positive development for the jury‘s 
search for truth.  To the extent that courts have been hesitant to admit VR 
evidence in jury trials, such hesitance is likely the result of institutional 
resistance to new technology.
40
 
Parts II, III, and IV of this Article explore concerns relating to the 
accuracy, reliability, and authenticity of, and potential for distortion within, 
IVEs under the substantial-similarity test that most courts employ in 
determining whether demonstrative evidence is unduly prejudicial or 
misleading, the best evidence rule as it relates to digital re-creations of real-
life objects, and the traditional methods of authentication, respectively. 
Part V explores the foundational requirements for expert testimony and 
scientific evidence.  It argues that, while the digital projections created by an 
IVE are not perfectly realistic representations of the objects that they seek to 
re-create, nonetheless, an IVE can be a fair and accurate representation of the 
scene that it represents, as long as an expert witness could lay the appropriate 
foundation to show that the IVE was reliable and accurate enough that its 
probative value would outweigh its inherent risks of distortion.  It argues that 
VR experts need to validate scientifically the consistency and reproducibility 
of IVE methodology and results and that attorneys seeking to use IVEs during 
trial must work to fit them within the strictures of the rules of evidence.  
Specifically, this Part argues that a proponent of expert testimony based upon 
VR technology, particularly a proponent wanting the jury to enter an IVE, 
would need to lay the necessary foundation to establish the following: (1) the 
IVE was relevant to a material dispute in the case (e.g., the vantage point of 
an eyewitness or a party); (2) the field of IVE generally, and the expert 
witness‘s IVE protocols in particular, were generally accepted among the 
relevant scientific community, presumably computer experts; (3) the expert 
 
40. See H.D. Wendorf, Some Views on Jury Views, 15 BAYLOR L. REV. 379, 385–87 (1963) 
(describing the ―legalistic inertia‖ and ―anti-newness‖ that led courts in Texas to resist the institution 
of the jury view). 
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witness could demonstrate an ability to produce reliable and accurate IVEs 
without significant distortion; and (4) the IVE protocols and their accuracy 
had been scientifically validated and subjected to peer review, and there was 
some meaningful way to define and measure error within the IVEs created. 
Part VI argues that permitting a jury to enter and interact within an IVE is 
not without precedent in the American legal system.  It points out that most 
American jurisdictions have historically permitted juries to visit the scene of a 
crime or accident in the middle of trial as part of their factual inquiry, even 
though the scene that the jury views is no longer in the same state that it was 
in at the time of the events in question, as long as the scene remains in a 
substantially similar state as at the time of the alleged crime or accident.  This 
Part notes that, despite clear distortions in the scenes of crimes and accidents 
that occur between the events at issue and the trial, the common law 
recognizes that the probative value of an on-site view of the scene outweighs 
the potential undue prejudice or jury confusion that may result from an 
imperfect replication of the scene and leaves to argument by the parties the 
weight that the jury should place on the imperfections. 
Part IV also argues that an IVE created to simulate the scene of a crime or 
accident so that the jury could virtually view it could be a more accurate way 
to reconstruct the scene than a live jury viewing, since the IVE could simulate 
the time of day and presence of physical evidence in a way that the actual 
scene, stripped of much of its material evidence prior to jury viewing, could 
not.  This Part analogizes the use of an IVE to reconstruct a crime scene to the 
introduction of crime scene photographs into evidence and argues that, if an 
IVE can re-create a scene that is more accurate than photographs taken at a 
later time or under different circumstances than those present at the time of 
the events in question, such evidence is more helpful to a jury than 
photographic evidence or a live viewing of the scene.  It argues that there is 
no reason why IVE technology should be subjected to any different or more 
strenuous thresholds for admissibility than any other representational medium. 
Part VII discusses the use of expert witnesses and IVEs to reconstruct 
crime scenes during criminal trials.  It argues that, in the context of a criminal 
case, there are two additional advantages that an IVE re-creation of a crime 
scene would have over an actual jury viewing or other representational 
evidence: (1) an IVE could be controlled in a way that could eliminate certain 
Federal Rule of Evidence (Rule) 403 concerns without diminishing the 
probative value of the evidence, and (2) the use of an IVE representing the 
events in question could provide a vehicle for a criminal defendant to 
introduce evidence of, and permit the jury to test, her version of events 
without having to waive her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
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II.  RULE 403 AND THE SUBSTANTIAL-SIMILARITY TEST 
Digital projections in an IVE are not perfectly realistic representations of 
the objects and events that they seek to re-create.
41
  VR models are created 
based upon witnesses‘ observations of what happened, and those baseline 
assumptions within the model may or may not be made explicit.
42
  Two 
different VR models built upon two different sets of assumptions about a 
material fact can produce two different outcomes.
43
  VR models can also 
permit people to view and navigate a scene in ways not possible in the 
physical world—for example, by ―teleporting,‖ flying, or walking through 
walls.
44
 
One concern with using an IVE with a jury would be whether the IVE 
would be misinterpreted by, or inappropriately persuasive to, lay jurors.  This 
concern arises for at least two reasons.  First, VR models can look deceptively 
like photographs of the scenes that they depict.  Media theorists refer to this 
phenomenon as the appeal of transparency.
45
  Cognitive and social 
psychologists refer to it as naive realism: the compelling impression that one 
has unmediated access to objective reality.
46
  IVEs may be convincing as 
evidence because of their ability to induce epistemic confusion—they suggest 
that the jury is looking directly at the scene of the crime or accident.  In other 
words, IVEs have been remediated to a familiar medium (photography) that 
jurors are already accustomed to seeing through directly to reality. 
Second, IVEs could be uniquely persuasive to jurors because of their 
status as scientific models.  An IVE representing the scene of a crime or 
accident appears as a mechanized, computerized, and, therefore, objective 
 
41. Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 262.  Of course, photographs, long admitted as accurate 
representations of the objects whose image they capture, are not perfect representations of those 
images either.  Id. at 259. 
42. Id. at 258.  There are two philosophies on building IVE models.  The first, the ―top-down‖ 
approach, is to take multiple photographs of a scene from different angles and use software that can 
―stitch‖ them together to provide a seamless representation of the scene and calculate depth from 
algorithms that take into account the distances between objects seen from different angles.  The 
second, the ―bottom-up‖ approach, is to build each object in the virtual scene individually—for 
example, the car, the tire, the floor of the alley, each bystander.   
43. Sometimes it may not be possible to have ground truth of what a scene looked like—for 
example, if lighting, weather, or traffic patterns are different from day to day. 
44. There are ways to ―lock‖ these features and ensure that individuals immersed in the IVE do 
not deviate from a human perspective by using processes like collision detection (which prohibits 
virtual individuals in an IVE from walking through physical objects).  See Bailenson et al., supra 
note 16, at 251 (stating that an IVE can track a person‘s actual movements). 
45. See JAY DAVID BOLTER & RICHARD GRUSIN, REMEDIATION: UNDERSTANDING NEW 
MEDIA (1999). 
46. See Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive 
Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404 
(1995). 
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(i.e., highly reliable) segment of scientific knowledge.  In addition, an IVE is 
a mathematized entity, the visual representation of a series of computerized 
measurements and computations.  The impact of IVEs derives, therefore, from 
IVEs‘ similarity to other symbols of scientific truth in society at large. 
Another concern with using an IVE with a jury would be whether the 
medium itself would unfairly distort the message that the witnesses were 
endeavoring to communicate, by engendering inferences that were not 
supported by witness testimony because of the assumptions on which the VR 
models were based.  IVE technology, in particular, has the innate power to 
appeal to a jury‘s emotional and subconscious processes because of its ability 
to use symbolic patterns that convey powerfully ingrained psychological 
messages that are altogether different from the purported purpose of the aid.  
Psychologists have also documented phenomena such as virtual-source 
monitoring confusion, in which virtual memories become real.
47
  A recent 
study has shown, for example, that children form false memories very quickly 
in VR worlds.
48
 
These concerns with persuasive distortion increase with the sophistication 
of the medium in question, particularly in a computerized medium such as 
IVE technology, because of the increased probability that a jury would lend 
more credibility to an impressive IVE because of VR‘s artificial sensation of 
precision and certainty—for example, by assuming that an IVE was to scale 
when it was not
49
 or drawing conclusions based upon the positioning, path, 
speed, and reaction times of the objects portrayed.
50
  Because of these risks of 
unfairness and inaccuracy, the most significant evidentiary barrier to the use 
of an IVE during a jury trial would be the overarching dictate of Rule 403,
51
 
and the substantial-similarity requirement.
52
 
 
47. See Hunter G. Hoffman et al., Virtual Reality Monitoring: Phenomenal Characteristics of 
Real, Virtual, and False Memories, 4 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 565, 566 (2001). 
48. See generally Kathryn Y. Segovia & Jeremy N. Bailenson, Virtually True: Children’s 
Acquisition of False Memories in Virtual Reality, 12 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 371 (2009), available at 
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a917321633~db=all~jumptype=rss. 
49. Much has been written in the VR field on the issue of ―distance perception‖—the concept 
that individuals consistently misperceive distances even when they are modeled to scale.  See 
generally EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966).  Because of this chronic 
misperception, some VR experts advocate the need to make virtual distances greater than real 
distances in order for VR users to accurately perceive the real distances psychologically.  See, e.g., 
Bly v. Arkansas, 593 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1980). 
50. But see Bly, 593 S.W.2d at 456 (finding no error in the admission into evidence of a crime 
scene investigator‘s diagrams and sketches of the scene, even though they were not drawn to scale, 
reasoning that ―[o]bviously, this was of assistance to the witnesses in offering their testimony and 
probably aided the jury in understanding what the witness was saying‖) (citations omitted). 
51. Rule 403 states: ―Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
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The case of Cartier v. Jackson
53
 exemplifies the concerns that courts often 
have with demonstrative exhibits that are imperfect representations of 
material facts.  Cartier was a singer-songwriter who alleged that Michael 
Jackson‘s song ―Dangerous‖ infringed on the copyright of her earlier song by 
the same name.
54
  Cartier retained a recording engineer to produce 
comparison tapes, which extracted portions from each version of 
―Dangerous.‖55  The tempo of the excerpts from Jackson‘s version of the song 
was slowed on the comparison tapes, and the key of the excerpts was changed 
to accommodate the slowing.
56
  The tape also looped back on themselves 
musical phrases that were not repeated in the original song and spliced 
together parts of the choruses that were not adjacent in the originals.
57
  
Without citing a specific rule of evidence, the district court excluded Cartier‘s 
evidence, concluding that the comparison tapes did not ―fairly and accurately 
depict[] the original.‖58  Upholding the exclusion of the evidence on appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted the 
district court‘s ruling as a finding that the recordings could have misled the 
jury under Rule 403 and found that such ruling was not an abuse of discretion 
because ―the changes made to the songs in these recordings were so 
significant that the tapes no longer represented the songs in question in this 
case.‖59 
 
evidence.‖  FED. R. EVID. 403.  In any trial, the trial court retains an inherent authority to protect the 
fairness of the proceedings by preventing unfair prejudice from potentially extraneous influences, 
particularly under Rule 403, which comprises the power to preclude the presentation of a 
demonstrative exhibit or illustrative aid that would create a significant risk of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or the needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.  See FED. R. EVID. 403.  Most states have evidentiary rules functionally indistinguishable 
from the federal rule.  See, e.g., MD. R. EVID. 5-403; PA. R. EVID. 403; S.C. R. EVID. 403; FLA. STAT. 
§ 90.403 (2009); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 403 (2010). 
The court could also exclude an IVE due to related concerns pursuant to Rule 611 (authorizing 
the court to ―exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and 
presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the 
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment‖). 
52. See, e.g., Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 974–75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1991) (rejecting a video simulation of a high-speed rear-end automobile collision when the tests 
were not similar enough because there were too many variables between the tests and the evidence 
was presented to render the tests probative on any point raised). 
53. 59 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1995). 
54. Id. at 1047. 
55. Id. at 1049. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
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Most courts deal with the question of fair representation by employing 
some variation of this substantial-similarity test, which requires that 
demonstrative exhibits share substantial enough similarity with the items that 
they seek to represent that they constitute fair and accurate representations of 
those items.
60
  That is what happened in the high-profile case of Harris v. 
Texas.
61
  Harris discovered that her husband was having an affair when a 
private investigator notified her that her husband had checked into a hotel 
with another woman.
62
  Shortly thereafter, Harris and her stepdaughter, 
Lindsey, drove to the hotel, where they found and vandalized the woman‘s 
car.
63
  Harris and Lindsey called Harris‘s husband on his cellular telephone 
and told him that one of his other children was ill.
64
  When her husband and 
the other woman left the hotel, Harris struck her husband with her car, 
throwing his body approximately sixty-five feet.
65
  When he landed, she 
circled her car around in the parking lot and ran over him again, killing him.
66
  
The entire incident was caught on tape by the private investigator that Harris 
had hired to follow her husband.
67
 
At Harris‘s ensuing murder trial, the crucial disputed issue was how many 
times Harris had run over her husband.
68
  The private investigator‘s video was 
of poor quality.
69
  The State of Texas called six eyewitnesses who testified 
that she had driven over her husband‘s body multiple times while circling in 
the parking lot.
70
  The defense proffered a VR re-creation of Harris‘s route in 
the parking lot, made by an expert accident reconstructionist using computer 
animation, simulation, scene measurements, and the videotape taken by the 
private investigator.
71
  The tape supported the reconstructionist‘s theory that, 
given the final resting place of the body and the location of a blood stain next 
to it, Harris ran over her husband only once by demonstrating that Harris‘s car 
never drove over the blood stain.
72
  The tape did not use a model or dummy to 
 
60. See, e.g., Ramseyer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 417 F.2d 859, 864 (8th Cir. 1969); Gillam v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 341 F.2d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 1965); Larson v. Meyer, 161 N.W.2d 165, 167–68 (N.D. 
1968); Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 13 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Neb. 1944). 
61. 152 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App. 2004). 
62. Id. at 788–89. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 789. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 789–90. 
69. Id. at 789. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 790. 
72. Id. at 790, 793. 
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represent the body and had an ―X‖ to indicate the location of the critical blood 
stain.
73
 
The trial court recognized the validity of the field of accident 
reconstruction and the expert‘s qualifications and found that the proffered VR 
exhibit was relevant to the case; the court, however, excluded the video due to 
concerns with the potential of the inaccurate format of the evidence to mislead 
and confuse the jury, particularly the omission of a body near the blood stain, 
and found that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value 
of the exhibit.
74
  The trial court permitted Harris to introduce a substantial 
number of charts and drawings illustrating the defense expert‘s opinion 
testimony, including a poster showing the movement of Harris‘s car as it 
circled in the parking lot.
75
  The jury found Harris guilty of murder, with a 
special finding that she caused her husband‘s death in the heat of passion 
upon adequate provocation.
76
  The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court‘s exclusion of the VR evidence on the ground that whether the VR 
simulation would have been misleading and confusing to the jury fell within 
the zone of reasonable disagreement and did not constitutionally impair 
Harris‘s opportunity to present a complete defense, requiring the court to 
leave its admission or exclusion committed to the trial court‘s discretion.77 
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court reached a 
similar conclusion in Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Associates,
78
 a case 
involving the Rodds‘ use of super-magnified computer images of 
mammograms in a medical malpractice, wrongful death action.  To assist the 
jury in explaining the appearance of a malignancy in a mammogram and to 
simulate for the jury what the defendants, who treated the decedent, Maria 
Rodd, saw when they viewed her mammogram films using a magnifying lens, 
the Rodds‘ attorney digitally scanned selected portions of Rodd‘s 
mammograms into a computer to produce images that were magnified by 
anywhere between 30 and 150 times the size of the X-rays, which were then 
projected onto a six-foot-by-eight-foot screen for the jury to view.
79
  The 
Rodds‘ expert testified that ―viewing the computerized images on the large 
screen from the perspective of the jury was similar to a radiologist viewing a 
mammogram film on a light box from close observation using a four-times 
magnifying glass,‖ although he conceded that he examined mammograms 
 
73. Id. at 790. 
74. Id. at 790, 792–23; see also TEX. R. EVID. 403. 
75. Harris, 152 S.W.2d at 794. 
76. Id. at 788. 
77. Id. at 794. 
78. 860 A.2d 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
79. Id. at 1006. 
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with a handheld magnifying glass and did not project them to the size of the 
demonstrative exhibits offered into evidence.
80
 
The defense objected to the use of the super-magnified computer images, 
in part because of the potential for distortion and confusion engendered by use 
of the super-magnified images—specifically, that the Rodds ―may have 
created the appearance  that the cluster was focal‖ by compressing the image 
and ―showing only a selective cluster rather than an all-inclusive picture of the 
calcifications.‖81  The trial judge permitted the Rodds to use the large-screen 
computer projections, over the defense‘s objection, including in cross-
examination of the defense expert, because such projections would aid the 
jury.
82
 
On appeal, the Appellate Division held that the computer imagery 
displayed to the jury ―was unduly influential, potentially confusing, 
susceptible of being accepted as substantive evidence, and clearly capable of 
producing an unjust result,‖ thus, warranting a new trial.83  The court reasoned 
that the use of computerized images to demonstrate that a cancerous cluster 
existed and was clearly visible on the mammogram films had the potential to 
confuse the jurors and distract them from assessing the defendants‘ action 
under the correct standard of care, which was to view the  mammogram with a 
2.5-power magnifying lens.
84
  The court explained that the demonstration did 
more than simply illustrate the Rodds‘ expert‘s testimony, but rather provided 
the jury with ―testimonial evidence—independent proof‖ of what could and 
should have been seen by the defendants using the standard magnifying 
glass.
85
 
In the case of IVEs, their probative value outweighs their epistemic 
pitfalls.  Even though they may be unduly or improperly persuasive for the 
reasons discussed supra, the dangers that they may pose to a jury‘s decision 
making do not compel their per se exclusion from the courtroom.  Reliable 
jury decision making about questions to which IVEs are relevant is best 
pursued not by excluding IVEs, but rather by admitting them and allowing 
expert witnesses and lawyers to educate jurors about computer scientists‘ 
construction and interpretation of their content. 
Courts routinely admit all manners of photographs, conventional, digital,
86
 
and digitally enhanced,
87
 yet all photographs are virtual environments of sorts.  
 
80. Id. at 1006–07. 
81. Id. at 1007. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1012. 
84. Id. at 1011. 
85. Id. 
86. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 50-2209.01(b) (2010) (―Recorded images taken by an automated 
traffic enforcement system are prima facie evidence of an infraction and may be submitted without 
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Conventional photographs are created when a camera focuses light onto a 
piece of film using mechanical shutters, creating a negative, which is then 
developed into a print with chemicals.
88
  When an individual uses a camera to 
take a photograph, she makes all kinds of judgments about lighting, shooting 
angle, and field of view—judgments that involve inherent distortions.89 
Digital photographs are created when ―[a] digital camera focuses the light 
onto a semiconductor device that records the information [in binary code (a 
series of ones and zeros)], which can be read and interpreted by a 
computer.‖90  Once in a digital format, all forms of information—sound, 
graphics, text, and video—can be stored, accessed, retrieved, manipulated, 
organized, and sent over the Internet at any time from any location.
91
  From 
the binary code of a digital photograph, a computer creates pixels (the tiny 
colored dots that make up the larger images).
92
  Because the pixels, which are 
sets of bits that represent a graphic image, can be manipulated, larger images 
can be easily altered.
93
  Digitally enhanced photographs are made by 
―manipulating the pixels in [a] picture to provide greater clarity.‖94  The issue 
 
authentication.‖). 
87. See, e.g., State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 943 (Conn. 2004) (admitting enhanced digital 
photographs of bite marks). 
88. PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 357 (2d ed. 2008). 
89. See Tal Golan, Visual Images in the Courtroom: A Historical Perspective, 14 PARALLAX 
77, 78 (2008).  Initially, courts and commentators were resistant to the admission of photographic 
evidence because of the unique persuasive power of its reality and immediacy.  See id. at 79; 
Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 41–42 (1998). 
90. RICE, supra note 88, at 357. 
91. See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PRIMER FOR LEGAL 
PROFESSIONALS § 1.2(A) (2009). 
92. RICE, supra note 88, at 357. 
93. Id.; Michael Cherry, Reasons to Challenge Digital Evidence and Electronic Photography, 
27 CHAMPION 42, 42–43 (2003); Jill Witkowski, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New 
Foundation Requirements for the Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 267, 
271 (2002) (―Digital images are easier to manipulate than traditional photographs and digital 
manipulation is more difficult to detect.‖). 
As one commentator explains: 
[S]hadows could be added to adjacent buildings to make the time of the 
photograph and the ambient light appear to be different from that which existed 
when the accident or crime happened; a drawn gun could be placed in the hands 
of a police officer; an identifying badge could be added to a hat. 
RICE, supra note 88, at 358. 
Conventional photography can also manipulate a print from a negative, . . . 
[and c]onventional printing can change appearance by increasing or decreasing 
contrast, focus, or size. . . .  [B]ut the possibilities are miniscule compared to the 
enhancement options available through digital technology. 
Id. at 362. 
94. Id. at 305.  Computer alteration of digital photographs can range from enhancement (e.g., 
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of whether an alteration is an enhancement or a distortion also arises with 
videotapes.
95
  Nonetheless, black-and-white, color, digital, and video 
photographs have all been ―successfully integrated into the evidentiary terrain 
under the illustrative evidence doctrine to be treated merely as graphic 
expression of human testimony.‖96 
Courts also routinely admit all kinds of other visual images produced 
using more sophisticated technologies: X-rays, computer-generated 
animations and simulations,
97
 digitally enhanced images of latent fingerprints 
or DNA profiles, and medical-imaging technologies, such as computed 
tomography (CT scans), positron emission tomography (PET scans), single-
photon-emission computed tomography (SPECT scans), and magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRIs).
98
 
Nonetheless, the potential for fraud, even hard-to-detect fraud, does not 
typically render other forms of visual-image evidence inadmissible.
99
  Rather, 
established evidentiary principles are applied to test the accuracy, reliability, 
and authenticity of such articles on a case-by-case basis.
100
  To the extent that 
an IVE alters, or varies with, any of the material attributes of the scene, the 
trial court will merely have to appraise how those variations impact the 
 
improving sharpness, contrast, and visibility and isolating patterns and colors) to restoration (adding 
details missing from a photograph based upon a preexisting conception of what the end result should 
look like) to fraudulent manipulation (transfiguring the image originally recorded by the camera).  Id. 
at 362; State v. Hayden, 950 P.2d 1024, 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
95. Nooner v. State, 907 S.W.2d 677, 686 (Fla. 1995) (admitting digital photographs of a 
suspect that had been copied from a videotape and enhanced because the jury had the opportunity to 
view the original videotape along with the photographs and identify for itself any distortion within 
the photographs); Dolan v. State, 743 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); RICE, supra note 
88, at 362. 
96. Golan, supra note 89, at 86. 
97. The first major case concerning the admissibility of a computer simulation was Perma 
Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding the admission of expert 
testimony based on computer simulations). 
98. Golan, supra note 89, at 77; see also Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973–74 
(8th Cir. 1995) (allowing into evidence PET and MRI scans); Berry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 709 So. 2d 
552, 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (reversing trial court‘s exclusion of SPECT evidence); Green v. 
K-Mart Corp., 01-675, pp. 16–24 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/18/03); 849 So. 2d 814, 826–30 (upholding the 
admission of PET-based testimony to diagnose prior brain trauma). 
99. See, e.g., Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 478 (N.Y. 1881) (asserting that photographs were 
not substantively different from the more traditional forms of visual evidence that courts had 
admitted for centuries). 
100. United States v. Salcido, 506 F.3d 729, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
government is not required to introduce an expert to authenticate child pornography images); United 
States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a claim that the government must 
present extrinsic evidence to prove the reality of children depicted in images purported to be child 
pornography); United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that extrinsic 
evidence was not required to prove the reality of children depicted in child-pornography images); 
United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003) (―Juries are still capable of 
distinguishing between real and virtual images . . . .‖). 
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balance between the probative value of the IVE and its potential to mislead, 
confuse, or create unfair prejudice under Rule 403, like with any other 
proffered exhibit.
101
  Concerns with potential distortion should normally be 
entrusted to the jury as a factor in its resolution of the weight to be given such 
evidence.
102
 
IVEs may produce unsanctioned meanings in jurors‘ minds, but all images 
displayed in court are capable of doing this.  Implicit meanings are ingrained 
in all visual representations.
103
  In any photograph, there is decreased 
information when compared to the original image, such as fewer pixels and 
the conversion of three-dimensional objects into two-dimensional images, 
which depend upon numerous assumptions about perspectives, distance, and 
relationships between objects.
104
  ―[T]he lens used on [any] camera can distort 
the apparent distance and relationship of things to one another.‖105 
Nonetheless, the rules of evidence do not exclude all photographic 
images.  Instead, because the law of evidence recognizes that all visual 
representations may prompt jurors to find facts or reach judgments for 
improper reasons, it subjects them (as it does all other evidence) to the 
balancing test of Rule 403.
106
  Some visual representations survive this 
inquiry; others do not.
107
  There is no rationale for treating IVEs specially. 
IVEs may, on balance, decrease rather than increase epistemic biases.  
Photographs lose the z axis (depth), while IVEs preserve it.  Because IVEs 
can capture three-dimensional information about depth and portray images 
from multiple angles and distances, they are generally a more accurate 
representation than two-dimensional photographs.
108
  Although excluding 
IVEs may preclude some kinds of distortion, admitting IVEs may rectify other 
kinds.  If an IVE can re-create a scene that is more accurate than photographs 
taken at a later time or under different circumstances than those present at the 
 
101. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City S. R.R. Co., 02-1505, p. 3 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/28/03); 846 
So. 2d 980, 983 (holding that a computer-generated animation of the scene of a railroad crossing was 
inadmissible because it was based upon inaccurate facts); State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 295 
(Minn. 2002) (holding that it was error to admit a computer-generated animation that included the 
facial expressions of the victim because the facial expressions had no probative value and were 
unfairly prejudicial). 
102. See FED. R. EVID. 104(e). 
103. See Richard K. Sherwin et al., Law in the Digital Age: How Visual Communication 
Technologies Are Transforming the Practice, Theory, and Teaching of Law, 12 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. 
L. 227, 245 (2006). 
104. See RICE, supra note 88, at 357–58, 362. 
105. Id. at 366 n.55. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See Bailenson et al., supra note 16, at 259. 
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time of the events in question, then such evidence is more helpful to a jury 
than photographic evidence or a live viewing of the scene.
109
 
The case of Colley v. Standard Oil Co.,
110
 which addressed the 
admissibility of photographs that a party had altered to make them better 
represent the scene at the time of the events in question, illustrates this point.  
Colley filed a wrongful death action seeking damages for the death of her 
husband, a train engineer who died from injuries received when his train 
collided with a Standard Oil truck at a grade crossing.
111
  At trial, over 
Colley‘s objection, the court permitted Standard Oil to admit photographs of 
the view to the north of the crossing, the direction in which the truck driver 
had been looking as he approached.
112
  The photographs ―had been altered 
artificially‖ by eliminating an area of the photograph where a store building 
had allegedly been obstructing the truck driver‘s view of approaching 
traffic.
113
  The reason for the alteration was that, between the time of the 
collision and the time of the trial, the building in question had burned down.
114
  
Colley objected to the admission of the photographs on the ground that ―they 
did not constitute a true representation of the scene.‖115 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
rejected Colley‘s objection, explaining: 
Here it was only an effort to make the photographs show, as 
nearly as was possible after the fire, what view of oncoming 
cars (or trains) there was in that particular direction at the 
time of the accident.  An unaltered photograph would not 
have shown this and would probably have created a much 
 
109. Courts have held that the availability of audiovisual depictions of the scene is pertinent to 
the resolution of whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a request for live scene view.  
See, e.g., United States v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1997) (―A court generally acts 
within [its discretion to permit a view] when there is sufficient evidence describing the scene in the 
form of testimony, diagrams, or photographs.‖); United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1305 
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding that the district court‘s decision to deny Martinez‘s request for a jury 
viewing of the crime scene was ―especially‖ reasonable because Martinez was afforded, but declined, 
the court‘s invitation to offer into evidence a defense-created videotape of the exterior and interior of 
the scene); United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that the use of 
photographic exhibits to illustrate the relevant features of the scene rendered a live jury view 
―cumulative, if not repetitive‖ and unduly time-consuming); United States v. Gallagher, 620 F.2d 
797, 801 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Gallagher‘s request that the jury be permitted to view the truck that he used to escape from the 
penitentiary because numerous photographs of the truck and its interior were admitted into evidence, 
which were adequate to show the disputed material facts relating to the truck). 
110. 157 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1946). 
111. Id. at 1008. 
112. Id. at 1008–09. 
113. Id. at 1008. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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more erroneous impression of the scene than could have been 
obtained from these altered photographs. . . .  The 
assumptions upon which this contention [that the blanked-out 
area in the photographs was mere theory and not accurate] is 
based are not borne out in the light of the detailed testimony 
of the photographer . . . .
116
 
As the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota explained 
in its rationale for admitting digitally enhanced photographs: 
[A]djustments to brightness or contrast, or enlargement of the 
image, while arguably a manipulation, are in fact no more 
manipulative than the recording process itself.  The image is 
black and white; the world is not.  In the non-digital world, a 
camera‘s lens, its aperture, shutter speed, length of exposure, 
film grain, and development process—all affect the image.  
Each of these is entirely unremarkable so long as the ―image‖ 
remains an accurate recording of that which occurred before 
the camera.  If a photographic negative were magnified by 
lens, and an enlarged image resulted, no one would question 
the larger picture.  Similarly, in the event of a tape recording, 
no one would comment if the volume were increased to make 
a recorded conversation more easily heard—again, so long as 
the volume-increased words were accurately recorded by the 
recording medium.
117
 
Because of the concerns with distortion and manipulation of IVE 
evidence, courts should ensure that there are rigorous mechanisms for an 
opposing party to discover and challenge IVE evidence.  The rules of criminal 
procedure provide for pretrial reciprocal discovery of documents and objects 
(including photographs and ―tangible objects‖), the results and reports of 
scientific tests and experiments, and a summary of expert testimony that either 
party intends to use in its case in chief.
118
  The rules of civil procedure are 
broader and require pretrial reciprocal discovery of data compilations and 
tangible things, including electronically stored information (ESI), that either 
party may use to support its claims or defenses and comprehensive reports 
detailing testimony of any expert that either party may call as a witness.
119
  
 
116. Id. at 1009–10. 
117. United States v. Seifert, 351 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928 (D. Minn. 2005). 
118. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)–(b). 
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).  In 2006, Rule 34 was specifically amended to encompass the 
discovery of ESI.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).  The new rule was intended to ―cover all current types 
of computer-based information‖ and to be ―flexible enough to encompass future changes and 
developments.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) advisory committee‘s notes.  Amended Rule 34(a) establishes 
the right of a party to ―test‖ or ―sample‖ ESI, rather than merely inspect or copy it.   
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).  Parties to civil proceedings may also serve upon one another written 
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While Rule 403 does not expressly list surprise as a ground for exclusion of 
otherwise probative evidence, courts have found that advance notice (or lack 
thereof) was an element in deciding whether admission of a proffered exhibit 
would result in unfair prejudice.
120
  In both criminal and civil cases, a court 
has the discretion to sanction any party who fails to fulfill these discovery 
requirements, including by compelling disclosure and prohibiting the party 
from introducing the undisclosed item into evidence.
121
  Taken together, these 
discovery mechanisms should enable a party to detect distortions in another 
party‘s (or the court‘s) IVE evidence and to challenge it, under the extant 
rules of evidence, if it is not fair and accurate.
122
 
III.  BEST EVIDENCE 
Because an IVE is largely a re-creation of physical evidence based upon 
out-of-court investigation, the use of IVE technology in the courtroom could 
also give rise to best evidence rule concerns.
123
  The Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 
Ltd.
124
 case provides an example.  Seiler was a graphic artist who claimed that 
the Imperial Walkers in the film The Empire Strikes Back infringed his 
copyright on an earlier invention, the ―Garthian Striders.‖125  At a pretrial 
evidentiary hearing, Seiler could not produce any originals of the Striders that 
existed prior to the film.
126
  Instead, he sought to rely upon ―reconstructions‖ 
of the original works that he had deposited with the United States Copyright 
Office one year after the release of The Empire Strikes Back.
127
  The district 
court ruled that the best evidence rule prevented Seiler from introducing 
 
interrogatories, see FED. R. CIV. P. 33, requests for production of documents (including drawings, 
graphs, charts, photographs, and other data compilations), see FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a), and admissions 
to the truth of any relevant matters (including the authenticity of computer data and other electronic 
information), see FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a).  The parties may also compel production of ESI in the 
possession of third parties by use of subpoenas.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)–(c), 45(a). 
120. See, e.g., Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1984). 
121. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), (c)(1). 
122. See RICE, supra note 88, at 399 (arguing that expanded pretrial discovery can justify a 
lesser foundation for authenticity). 
123. See FED. R. EVID. 1002 (requiring an original document to prove the contents of a writing, 
recording, or photograph).  But see Commonwealth v. Leneski, 846 N.E.2d 1195, 1198–99 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2006) (―Videotapes, like photographs, are not subject to the best evidence rule. . . .  As with 
videotapes, we think that digital image evidence is not subject to the best evidence rule, as such 
images are not writings. . .‖) (citation omitted).  Some commentators have noted the nonsensical 
nature of a discussion of an ―original record‖ in the context of digital evidence.  See, e.g., PAUL, 
supra note 15, at 13–14; RICE, supra note 88, at 304. 
124. 808 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1986). 
125. Id. at 1317. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1318. 
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secondary evidence of the Striders.
128
  As a result, Seiler had no admissible 
evidence, and the court granted summary judgment to Lucasfilm.
129
 
On appeal, Seiler contended, inter alia, that the best evidence rule did not 
apply to his works because the rule embraced only the written word.
130
  The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Seiler‘s 
contention, holding that his reconstructions were ―writings‖ within the 
meaning of Rule 1001 because they consisted of the ―equivalent‖ of ―letters, 
words, or numbers.‖131  The court reasoned: ―Seiler‘s drawings are objective 
manifestations of the creative mind.‖132  The court explained: 
The facts of this case implicate the very concerns that 
justify the best evidence rule.  Seiler alleges infringement by 
The Empire Strikes Back, but he can produce no documentary 
evidence of any originals existing before the release of the 
movie.  His secondary evidence does not consist of true 
copies or exact duplicates but of ―reconstructions‖ made after 
The Empire Strikes Back.  In short, Seiler claims that the 
movie infringed his originals, yet he has no proof of those 
originals. 
The dangers of fraud in this situation are clear.  The rule 
would ensure that proof of the infringement claim consists of 
the works alleged to be infringed.  Otherwise, 
―reconstructions‖ which might have no resemblance to the 
purported original would suffice as proof for infringement of 
the original.  Furthermore, application of the rule here defers 
to the rule‘s special concern for the contents of writings.  
Seiler‘s claim depends on the content of the originals, and the 
rule would exclude reconstituted proof of the originals‘ 
content.  Under the circumstances here, no ―reconstruction‖ 
can substitute for the original.
133
 
 
128. Id. at 1317; see FED. R. EVID. 1004(1). 
129. Seiler, 808 F.2d at 1317. 
130. Id. at 1318–19. 
131. Id. at 1318–19; see FED. R. EVID. 1001(1). 
132. Seiler, 808 F.2d at 1320. 
133. Id. at 1319.  Because of these hurdles to introducing a VR simulation into evidence, the 
use of VR technology during trial may fit more comfortably within the framework of traditional 
illustrative aids to demonstrate testimony—maps, charts, graphs, cardboard cutouts, and the like.  
Unlike demonstrative exhibits, illustrative aids do not have to be admissible into evidence for an 
attorney to use them during trial presentation.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text.  Their 
singular function is to illustrate the testimony of a witness or to demonstrate a point made by counsel 
in argument.  See id.  Attorneys employ illustrative aides for ―pedagogical‖ ends, not for the truth of 
their contents.  See id.  The case of Gomez v. Great Lakes Steel, 803 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986), is 
illustrative of this distinction.  Great Lakes Steel challenged the admission into evidence of one of 
Gomez‘s exhibits, a summary of actual damages.  Id. at 257.  On appeal, the United States Court of 
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On the other hand, the best evidence rule may provide a justification for 
admitting a VR simulation into evidence.
134
  A ―mechanical or electronic 
recording‖ or ―other form of data compilation‖ is a writing or recording for 
the purposes of the best evidence rule.
135
  ―‗Photographs‘ include still 
photographs, X-ray films, video tapes, and ‗motion pictures.‘‖136  As the 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1001 explains: 
Traditionally the rule requiring the original centered upon 
accumulations of data and expressions affecting legal 
relations set forth in words and figures.  This meant that the 
rule was one essentially related to writings.  Present day 
 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the challenged exhibit was improperly admitted into 
evidence.  In reaching that conclusion, the court explained: 
Contents of charts or summaries admitted as evidence under Rule 1006 must 
fairly represent and be taken from underlying documentary proof which is too 
voluminous for convenient in-court examination, and they must be accurate and 
nonprejudicial. . . .  Such summaries or charts admitted as evidence under Rule 
1006 are to be distinguished from summaries or charts used as pedagogical 
devices which organize or aid the jury‘s examination of testimony or documents 
which are themselves admitted into evidence. . . .  Such pedagogical devices 
―are more akin to argument than evidence . . . .‖ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Because of this distinction between demonstrative exhibits that are admitted into evidence and 
aids that are used for illustrative purposes only, the best evidence rule would be inapplicable if a 
witness only identified an IVE ―as a correct representation of events which he saw or of a scene with 
which he is familiar.‖  FED. R. EVID. 1002 advisory committee‘s notes.  See also United States v. 
Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 
1996) (―[A] tape recording cannot be said to be the best evidence of a conversation when a party 
seeks to call a participant in or observer of the conversation to testify to it.  In that instance, the best 
evidence rule has no application at all.‖).  The rule would apply, on the other hand, if a witness 
sought to testify about the contents of an IVE without producing the physical item, particularly if the 
witness was not privy to the events the IVE depicted.  See FED. R. EVID. 1002 advisory committee‘s 
notes; Bennett, 363 F.3d at 953. 
This distinction between demonstrative exhibits and illustrative aids is not observed in all 
jurisdictions.  Even the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly address the in-court use of 
illustrative aids that are not admitted into evidence. 
134. The best evidence rule requires the production of an original document rather than a copy.  
FED. R. EVID. 1002.  Specifically, the rule provides that the original of a recording or photograph is 
required to prove the content thereof.  Id.; see also Bennett, 363 F.3d at 953.  Rule 1002 states: ―To 
prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress.‖  FED. R. 
EVID. 1002.  Under this test, while perfect identity is not required, the admissibility of a 
demonstrative exhibit again depends upon a foundational showing that there is a substantial 
similarity between the exhibit and the item that it seeks to re-create.  See FED. R. EVID. 1001(4), 
1002, 1004; see also Bennett, 363 F.3d at 953.  If an issue were raised as to whether an IVE correctly 
reflected its contents, such issue would be for the jury to decide, along with all of the other factual 
disputes in the case, and would not be a ground for exclusion by the court.  See FED. R. EVID. 1008. 
135. FED. R. EVID. 1001(1). 
136. FED. R. EVID. 1001(2). 
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techniques have expanded methods of storing data, yet the 
essential form which the information ultimately assumes for 
usable purposes is words and figures.  Hence the 
considerations underlying the rule dictate its expansion to 
include computers, photographic systems, and other modern 
developments.
137
 
The recent Bennett case demonstrates how an IVE might be not only 
admissible, but required to be admitted into evidence under the best evidence 
rule.  Drug enforcement agents observed Bennett‘s boat quickly traveling 
north along the California coastline off the coast of San Diego, near, but north 
of, the Mexican border.
138
  When the boat reached San Diego Bay, the agents 
boarded and searched the boat, eventually discovering more than a thousand 
pounds of hidden marijuana stashed onboard.
139
  Bennett was charged with 
importation of marijuana.
140
  It is an element of illegal importation of a 
controlled substance that the defendant bring the substance into the United 
States from ―any place outside thereof.‖141  To prove that Bennett had 
imported the marijuana found in his boat into the United States from Mexico, 
the government introduced the testimony of a customs officer who testified, 
over Bennett‘s evidentiary objections, that he had discovered a global 
positioning system (GPS) while searching Bennett‘s boat and that the 
―backtrack‖ feature of the GPS, which graphed the boat‘s journey that day, 
revealed that Bennett‘s boat had traveled from Rosarita, Mexico, to San Diego 
Bay.
142
  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the admission of the agent‘s GPS testimony was improper and 
reversed Bennett‘s conviction.143  The court found that the best evidence rule 
applied to the agent‘s GPS testimony because it involved his description of 
the content of a graphical description of data that the GPS had compiled about 
the path of Bennett‘s boat when the agent himself had not observed the boat 
travel the path depicted by the GPS.
144
  The court found that the GPS data 
 
137. FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee‘s notes.  But see 6 WEINSTEIN‘S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 1001.03 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2010). 
138. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 949. 
139. Id. at 949–50. 
140. Id. at 949; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). 
141. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (2006); Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952; United States v. Cabaccang, 332 
F.3d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
142. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 952. 
143. Id. at 949. 
144. Id. at 953 (citation omitted); see also State v. Springer, 197 S.E.2d 530, 536 (N.C. 1973) 
(explaining that proponents of computer-generated evidence occasionally flounder on the best 
evidence rule by presenting oral testimony based on a witness‘s review of computer data rather than 
introducing the actual data into evidence). 
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itself was the best evidence of the boat‘s travels.145  By the same token, if an 
expert witness had access to technology that could generate an immersive 
model of a crime or accident scene, for instance, the model itself could be the 
best evidence of the data that it contained, rather than the expert‘s live 
testimony. 
IV.  AUTHENTICITY 
All evidence submitted to a court must be authenticated—to wit, proven to 
be what the proponent claims it is.
146
  As commentators have previously 
noted, ―evidence often must be authenticated on several levels, [and s]cience 
and technology add another level.‖147  ―The inherent mutability of electronic 
data‖ raises questions about the applicability of traditional methods of 
authentication to IVEs.
148
  The authenticity of digital objects cannot be tested 
by inspection alone.
149
  Some commentators suggest that the ―unique potential 
for fraud with electronic evidence has diminished the value‖ of the traditional 
circumstantial methods of authentication.
150
 
The basic concern of authentication remains the same, however, with any 
type of physical evidence.  As one commentator notes, ―While the advent of 
digital technology has expanded the ways in which documents can be 
 
145. Bennett, 363 F.3d at 954. 
146. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).  For a witness to authenticate an IVE as documentary evidence by 
recognition, under Rule 901(b)(1), the witness would have to be able to identify and describe the 
IVE, attest to its genuineness, and provide a rational basis for her recognition of it.  See FED. R. 
EVID. 901(b)(1).  Because VR is a comparatively new technology, a proponent of an IVE would 
likely be required to demonstrate the authenticity of the representations contained therein, unlike the 
proponent of a more traditional type of visual media. 
By contrast, the only foundation that would have to be laid to use an IVE as an illustrative aid to 
testimony would be that the IVE would assist in presenting a witness‘s testimony.  As a general rule, 
as long as a witness could testify that the IVE was illustrative of her testimony, it could be used as an 
illustrative aid.  See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
147. RICE, supra note 88, at 393.  In addition to authenticating the IVE as fairly and accurately 
depicting the scene that it purported to re-create, the process used to generate the IVE would also 
have to be authenticated by a witness who could describe the process or system used to produce the 
IVE images and demonstrate that the process or system produced an accurate result.  FED. R. 
EVID. 901(b)(9); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. App. 2001); Sommervold v. Grevlos, 
518 N.W.2d 733, 738 (S.D. 1994).  By contrast, proponents of photographs are rarely required to 
make a foundational showing of the accuracy of the discipline of photography prior to admission of a 
photograph into evidence.  See, e.g., Rodd v. Raritan Radiological Assocs., 860 A.2d 1003, 1011–12 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that ―the use of a computer-generated exhibit requires a 
more detailed foundation than that for just photographs or photo enlargements‖ and contrasting the 
required foundation for computer-generated exhibits with that of photographs or photo 
enlargements).  Such authenticity could be established via deposition, declaration, requests for 
admission, expert testimony, and metadata (such as embedded file creation and modification dates).  
DURANSKE, supra note 3, at 53. 
148. RICE, supra note 88, at 335. 
149. See PAUL, supra note 15, at 21–23. 
150. RICE, supra note 88, at 335. 
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corrupted or forged, it has also expanded the ways in which they can be 
authenticated.‖151  The language of authenticity rules like Rule 901 establishes 
a variable benchmark of reliability that depends upon what the proponent of 
the IVE claimed the proffered evidence was.
152
  The proponent would have to 
be able to establish that the proffered item‘s purported content was complete, 
unaltered, and originated from an identifiable source.
153
  The proponent would 
not have to show that the IVE‘s content was true.154  An item of evidence 
making an erroneous or even untruthful assertion can unquestionably still be 
authentic.
155
  ―Accuracy is not the issue.‖156 
Like any photograph, an IVE could be authenticated by testimony from a 
sponsoring witness with personal knowledge of the scene or incident that it 
purported to re-create that the IVE accurately reproduced the scene of the 
crime or accident as the witness remembered it.
157
  The mere fact that a 
witness observed an event reconstructed in an IVE would not change the 
source of her personal knowledge. 
An IVE also might be able to be authenticated through expert testimony 
about the creation of the IVE, the source of the representations contained in it, 
and its ability to accurately re-create the events and perceptions as reported.
158
  
When expert testimony is employed to prove the authenticity of an IVE, 
authorship and recognition become proxies for the IVE‘s identity and 
authenticity. 
 
151. Id. 
152. The specific provision in Rule 901(b)(9) governs computer-generated evidence when the 
accuracy of a particular result of a computer-generated process depends upon the accuracy of the 
system or process producing it.  FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). 
153. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). 
154. Id. 
155. See PAUL, supra note 15, at 33. 
156. Id. 
157. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (permitting authentication through testimony of a witness 
with knowledge). 
158. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (permitting authentication through evidence of a process or 
system); State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 8–9 (Iowa 2003) (holding that expert‘s testimony was 
sufficient to authenticate computer-generated animated slides as illustrative evidence of shaken-baby 
syndrome); Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1180–82 (Pa. 2006) (holding that the testimony 
of the creator of a computer-generated animation that his program produced an accurate graphic 
presentation of his opinion was sufficient to establish the authenticity of the animation even though 
the creator had no firsthand knowledge of the crime, but rather based the reconstruction on the 
physical evidence, measurements, and other information provided by other witnesses); 
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 778 (Pa. 2007) (admitting a computer-generated videotape 
of shaken-baby syndrome in conjunction with expert‘s testimony about the cause of the injury and 
the accuracy of the animation based upon all of the available evidence); Dolan v. Florida,743 So. 2d 
544, 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (―Where there is testimony as to the nature of the store‘s video 
security system, the placement of the film in the camera, how the camera worked, the circumstances 
of removal of the tape and chain of possession of the tape, such testimony is sufficient authentication 
of the tape.‖). 
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V.  EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE RELIABILITY OF IVE METHODOLOGY 
The impediments that a proponent of an IVE would face, under Rule 403, 
the best evidence rule, or Rule 901, are chiefly matters of foundation, i.e., the 
admissibility of an IVE turns on whether the proponent could establish its 
accuracy, reliability, and authenticity.
159
  Another potential obstacle to the 
admissibility of IVE evidence is the barrier posed by the hearsay rule if the 
VR model is the product of information gathered or generated by humans 
outside of the courtroom.  Computer-generated evidence can be based on out-
of-court statements by witnesses not subject to cross-examination and offered, 
at least in part, to show the truth of those statements.  A jury entering an IVE 
(or even the proponent of the exhibit) likely would not know what 
components of the IVE were based on information from third-party sources, 
much less have a way to evaluate the credibility of those sources and their 
information, and the opposing party has no opportunity to cross-examine 
those sources.
160
 
Because of these foundational hurdles, an IVE often would be used at trial 
in conjunction with expert opinion testimony establishing the reliability of the 
IVE methodology.
161
  Admission of IVE evidence that could not rest upon the 
traditional foundations for substantive evidence could be accomplished as 
either part of the basis for expert opinion testimony,
162
 an illustrative aid to 
 
159. IVEs could also be subject to a hearsay objection.  Some of the representations in an IVE 
model are not based on the personal knowledge of the individual who designed the model.  As a 
consequence, hearsay, and multiple levels of it, could be a problem, given that those representations 
are being presented to the jury for their truth.  See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
160. Of course, these hearsay concerns arise only if the IVE is offered as substantive evidence 
to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.  See id.; Jennifer Robinson Boyle, Note, State v. 
Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the Future and Allow Computer Animations in 
Criminal Trials?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 371, 411 (1994): 
Demonstrative evidence does not qualify as hearsay because it is not 
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  Its function is to illustrate 
expert testimony.  It follows that because the computer animation was used 
solely as demonstrative evidence [to illustrate the witness‘s testimony ], it is not 
subject to the hearsay rule. 
Id.; see also James E. Carbine & Lynn McLain, Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility 
of Computer-Generated Evidence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1999) 
(noting that hearsay concerns are implicated only for ―computer-generated evidence . . . offered as 
substantive evidence‖). 
161. See, e.g., Serge, 896 A.2d at 1179–80. 
162. For example, a crime or accident scene reconstructionist or a medical examiner could 
testify about the cause and manner of an accident or a victim‘s death using an IVE as a visual 
presentation to illustrate his or her conclusions reached.  In People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), the first reported case to address a litigant‘s use of a graphic computer 
animation at trial, a New York trial court admitted a computer reenactment of a fatal car crash to 
illustrate defense expert testimony that the accident was the result of weather rather than the 
defendant‘s intoxication on the theory that the reenactment was ―more akin to a chart or diagram than 
a scientific device‖ even though it had been ―drawn by means of a computer.‖  Id. at 722; see also 
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expert testimony,
163
 or a stand-alone exhibit introduced through the testimony 
of an expert involved in creating the IVE.
164
 
IVEs are, in a sense, expert environments.  The IVE is not just a snapshot 
of the scene, but rather a computer model created to represent the scene.  An 
expert witness is needed to explain to the inexpert jury the array of 
sophisticated methodological and interpretive techniques and assumptions that 
were involved in the creation of the IVE. 
Under Rule 702, an expert may assist a jury with testimony ―in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise.‖165  Traditionally, this ―otherwise‖ has included 
tools like analogies and visual representations.
166
  The factual basis for an 
expert opinion can also include hearsay, other information relied upon by 
experts in the field,
167
 and hypothetical questions.
168
  Rule 703 allows experts 
 
Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1494–95 (D. Mont. 1995) (allowing the 
introduction of a computer simulation upon which an accident reconstruction expert had based his 
opinion). 
163. As discussed supra note 37, illustrative aids are ordinarily held to a less rigorous standard 
than substantive demonstrative evidence—namely, whether they aid the jury in understanding some 
fact of consequence in the case.  2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 212 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 
1999).  See, e.g., Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 579 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining that illustrative 
evidence is admitted solely to help a witness explain his testimony and has no probative value 
beyond that lent to it by the credibility of the witness whose testimony it illustrates); Hinkle v. 
Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 424 (4th Cir. 1996); People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 140 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1997); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. App. 2001); Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 
808–09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2003); Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863, pp. 46–
48 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/97); 712 So. 2d 885, 900–01; State v. Harvey, 26,613, pp. 9–12 (La. App. 
2 Cir. 1/25/95); 649 So. 2d 783, 788; Serge, 896 A.2d at 1179. 
 Nonetheless, some courts have subjected computer-generated images to the more demanding 
authentication standard for substantive evidence even when the images are offered solely to illustrate 
testimony.  See, e.g., State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 945 (Conn. 2004) (recognizing the difficulty of 
categorically distinguishing substantive and illustrative uses of visual evidence and the persuasive 
potential of visual images, and instituting a single, demanding authentication standard for all 
computer-generated evidence). 
164. See Carbine & McLain, supra note 160, at 4 (―In the above example of an air crash, there 
was no expert witness taking the stand to testify as to how the final moments of Flight 162 looked.  
The computer itself was the expert.‖). 
165. FED. R. EVID. 702 (emphasis added).  The rule states, in pertinent part: ―If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. . . .‖  Id. 
166. See, e.g., Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1976); 
Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (noting without 
ruling on the issue that ―[t]he defendants maintain that the animation was not itself a simulation, but 
rather, a visual representation of [an expert witness‘s] testimony concerning the results of one 
computer simulation program‖). 
167. FED. R. EVID. 703; United States v. Sims, 514 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1291 (5th Cir. 1971); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 643 
(D.C. Cir. 1962); State v. Oswalt, 463 P.2d 602, 603 (Or. Ct. App. 1970). 
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to testify without personal knowledge of the underlying facts or data and on 
the basis of hearsay or other otherwise inadmissible evidence, as long as the 
out-of-court sources are of a type ―reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field.‖169  If an expert witness relies upon outside facts in reaching 
an opinion, those facts themselves may be admissible.
170
  If an expert witness 
reasonably relied upon an IVE in reaching a conclusion about a material fact 
at dispute during trial, the IVE itself might be admissible, even if it would not 
have been admissible as a stand-alone demonstrative exhibit.
171
 
The underlying standard for the admissibility of scientific or technical 
expert evidence in all jurisdictions, whether under the traditional Frye
172
 
general-acceptance standard or the federal Rule 702
173
/Daubert
174
 standard, is 
reliability.
175
 
 
168. See Iconco v. Jensen Constr. Co., 622 F.2d 1291, 1301 (8th Cir. 1980) (explaining that a 
hypothetical question need not include all facts shown by the evidence, but must be ―in such a form 
as not to mislead or confuse the jury‖); Daniel D. Blinka, Ethics, Evidence, and the Modern 
Adversary Trial, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 49 (2006). 
169. Rule 703 states: 
The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before 
the hearing.  If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need 
not be admissible in evidence. 
FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).  See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 566 (6th Cir. 1993). 
170. FED. R. EVID. 705; United States v. McCollum, 732 F.2d 1419, 1422–23 (9th Cir. 1984). 
171. In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the Supreme Court recognized that the 
parties have a right to present evidence in the form that they deem best suited to meet jurors‘ 
expectations about what proof would be persuasive, even if that evidence is not logically necessary to 
the jury‘s verdict.  Thus, if IVE-based expert testimony itself were admissible, the proponent of the 
IVE evidence should be allowed to publish the IVE to the jury to avoid being unfairly prejudiced by 
having failed to live up to the jury‘s expectations about what computer-simulated evidence looks 
like.  See id. at 189. 
172. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. 1923) (holding that, for expert testimony 
regarding a scientific principle or discovery to be admissible, it ―must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs‖).  General acceptance 
exists when a substantial percentage of the applicable scientific community accepts the theory, 
principles, and methodology underlying scientific testimony because they are grounded in valid 
scientific principles.  See Bonds, 12 F.3d at 562; United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 
1975). 
173. FED. R. EVID. 702 (permitting an expert to testify to an opinion based upon scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge only ―if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or 
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case‖). 
174. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (holding that the Frye 
test had been superseded by Rule 702 and charging courts with the responsibility to act as 
gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert testimony and ensuring that scientific testimony is ―not only 
relevant, but reliable‖). 
The relevancy requirement stems from Rule 702‘s requirement that the testimony ―assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.‖  FED. R. EVID. 702.  Daubert 
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The case of United States v. Downing
176
 illustrates some of the hurdles 
and possibilities that a party would face when seeking to use an IVE during a 
jury trial.  Downing was charged with mail fraud, wire fraud, and interstate 
transportation of stolen property arising from a scheme to defraud vendors at 
national trade shows by pretending to be a member of the clergy with 
excellent credit references and ordering goods on credit without the intention 
to pay for them.
177
  The government‘s case against Downing consisted almost 
entirely of eyewitness testimony of twelve individuals who identified 
Downing as the fictional Reverend Claymore on the basis of brief interactions 
that they had with him years earlier.
178
  Downing sought to adduce, from a 
cognitive psychologist with expertise in human perception and memory, 
testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
179
  The 
district court refused to admit the testimony, based upon the belief that such 
testimony would not be ―helpful[]‖ to the jury under Rule 702.180  The United 
States Court of Appeals reversed the district court.
181
  The appeals court held 
that such testimony was admissible if the reliability of the scientific principles 
upon which it rested, and therefore the potential of the testimony to aid the 
jury in reaching an accurate resolution of a disputed issue, outweighed the 
likelihood that introduction of the testimony would, in some way, overwhelm 
or mislead the jury.
182
  The court also stated that such testimony was 
admissible if Downing could make a specific proffer that scientific research 
 
set forth a non-exhaustive checklist for assessing the reliability of scientific testimony: (1) whether 
the technique or theory can be tested or challenged in some objective manner (rather than a 
subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability); (2) whether the 
technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate 
of error of the technique; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) 
whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific community.  Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 593–94. 
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999), the Supreme Court clarified that 
the courts‘ gatekeeper function applied to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony, and 
indicated that the Daubert factors could be applicable in assessing the reliability of nonscientific 
expert testimony.  In 2000, Rule 702 was amended to codify Kumho Tire‘s amplified scope of 
application.  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee‘s notes. 
175. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  But see 
Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1176 n.3 (Pa. 2006) (holding that, because a computer-
generated animation was a graphic illustration of an expert‘s reconstruction, it was not subject to the 
Frye test for admissibility). 
176. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). 
177. Id. at 1227. 
178. Id. at 1227–28. 
179. See id. at 1228. 
180. Id. at 1226; see also FED. R. EVID. 702. 
181. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226. 
182. Id. 
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had established that particular features of the eyewitness identifications 
involved may have impaired the accuracy of the identifications.
183
 
To be used during trial in any form (as demonstrative evidence, an 
illustrative aid to testimony, or as the basis for an expert‘s opinion about a 
material issue in the case), an IVE would almost certainly be subject to some 
type of relevancy and balancing test fundamentally akin to the one spelled out 
by the court in Downing.  No matter the specific evidentiary function of an 
IVE, its proponent would have to be able to make some manner of 
foundational demonstration that the technology supporting it was reliable and 
accurate enough to outweigh its inherent dangers of distortion.
184
  The court‘s 
finding of the systemic and methodological reliability of IVE technology 
would underlie its ultimate finding of the authenticity and informational 
integrity of a particular IVE exhibit.  In other words, reliability would form 
the foundation for competency.
185
 
In many ways, the potential use of IVE technology in jury trials today is at 
the same stage of development—both in terms of the raw technology and the 
legal system‘s acceptance of the use of IVE technology and expert testimony 
about it—that the use of DNA analysis for forensic purposes was at a decade 
or so ago.  These days, expert testimony based upon forensic DNA analysis is 
largely unchallenged and often admitted subject to courts‘ taking judicial 
notice of its general reliability as forensic evidence.
186
  But this recognition of 
 
183. Id. at 1226, 1242. 
184. See, e.g., Rodd v. Raritan Radiological Assocs., 860 A.2d 1003, 1012 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2009) (requiring ―testimony from a witness who possesses sufficient knowledge of the 
technology used to create [computer-generated] exhibits‖ as foundation for their admissibility 
because of ―the reliability problems arising from computer-generated exhibits and the processes by 
which they are created‖). 
185. When X-rays were first discovered, many courts admitted them into evidence not upon 
proof of their individual accuracy, but rather upon expert testimony regarding the reliability of the 
processes that produced them.  Tal Golan, The Emergence of the Silent Witness: The Legal and 
Medical Reception of X-rays in the USA, 34 SOC. STUD. SCI. 469, 478 (2004) [hereinafter Golan, 
Silent Witness].  See, e.g., Bruce v. Beall, 41 S.W. 445, 446 (Tenn. 1897) (―New as [the X-ray] 
process is, experiments made by scientific men, as shown by this record, have demonstrated its 
power to reveal to the natural eye the entire structure of the human body, and that its various parts 
can be photographed as its exterior surface has been and now is.‖).  In time, courts took judicial 
notice of the reliability of X-ray technology.  See CHARLES C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE: 
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION § 791 (1942). 
186. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
reliability of the Polymerase Chain Reaction method of DNA analysis was sufficiently well 
established to permit courts to take judicial notice of it in all future cases).  Rule 201(b) permits a 
court to take ―judicial notice‖ of a particular fact when it is ―not subject to reasonable dispute in that 
it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned.‖  FED. R. EVID. 201(b); see also United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 800 (2d Cir. 
1992); Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355, 362 (Ala. 1998); Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 294 (Ark. 
1996); State v. Fleming, 698 A.2d 503, 506–07 (Me. 1997); State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1143 
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DNA‘s general reliability and probative value did not happen overnight.  
Instead, it was the result of two types of serious undertakings: (1) efforts by 
forensic molecular biologists to scientifically validate the consistency and 
reproducibility of the methodology and its results, and (2) efforts by attorneys 
to fit forensic DNA analysis within the strictures of the rules of evidence.  The 
same work now needs to be done by VR experts and attorneys seeking to use 
IVEs during trial. 
The Bonds case provides a blueprint for the type of reliability foundation 
that would have to be laid to admit expert testimony based upon IVE 
technology.  Bonds, a prospective Hell‘s Angel, was charged with federal 
firearms offenses along with two other gang members in connection with a 
shooting murder.
187
  The government‘s theory of the shooting was that Bonds 
and his co-defendants had mistaken the victim for a member of a rival 
motorcycle gang whom they had planned to ―hit‖ in retaliation for a shooting 
of a Hell‘s Angel the previous year.188  There were no eyewitnesses to the 
shooting, but at the scene of the shooting and in the getaway car there was a 
large quantity of blood which did not match the victim‘s blood.189  Bonds had 
a ricochet wound in his arm, which the government believed to be the source 
of the unidentified blood at the scene.
190
  The FBI eventually matched a 
sample of Bonds‘s blood to the blood at the crime scene and in the getaway 
car through DNA identification.
191
  Bonds‘s defense was mistaken identity.192 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, forensic DNA
193
 analysis was in its 
relative infancy.
194
  Prior to trial, Bonds challenged the admissibility of the 
DNA evidence.
195
  The magistrate judge ―conducted a six-week Frye hearing 
to determine whether the [government‘s] proposed experts‘ trial testimony 
about the DNA evidence was based upon principles generally accepted in the 
scientific community.‖196  The government‘s experts testified that the FBI‘s 
DNA procedures were generally accepted.
197
  Bonds challenged the DNA 
evidence on the ground that the particular methodology that the FBI employed 
in performing DNA analysis and the results that the FBI reached were 
 
(Utah 2001). 
187. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 546–47 (6th Cir. 1993). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 547. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 549. 
192. Id. at 547. 
193. ―DNA‖ stands for deoxyribonucleic acid. 
194. See Bonds, 12 F.3d at 549–50. 
195. Id. at 551. 
196. Id. (footnote omitted). 
197. Id. at 562. 
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unreliable, arguing that, had the tests been performed differently, using a 
different database for the calculation of the statistical probabilities of a false 
match, different materials in performing the test, or a different multiplication 
rule, the results would have been more accurate and perhaps different.
198
  
Bonds also challenged the way that the FBI methodology was tested, arguing 
that the FBI‘s probability estimate was imprecise and ―that the reliability of 
the results would have been greater had a different method of testing been 
employed.‖199  Bonds argued that the FBI‘s procedures for making statistical-
probability estimates were not generally accepted by population geneticists 
and molecular biologists.
200
  Bonds presented evidence about deficiencies in 
the accuracy of the match results and the inadequacy of the testing of the 
results.
201
  The defense experts demonstrated that a substantial controversy 
existed over whether the results produced were reliable and accurate.
202
 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that 
the district court admit the DNA evidence.
203
  In reaching his conclusion, the 
magistrate judge issued numerous factual findings about the challenged DNA 
evidence.
204
  The judge credited the expert testimony that established that the 
protocol used was generally accepted by other DNA labs.
205
  He found that the 
FBI was able to produce reliable results without a significant risk of false 
matches, despite some flaws in the protocol.
206
  He found that the defects in 
the FBI‘s validation studies ―did not affect [the FBI‘s] ability reliably to make 
accurate determinations of matches and avoid false positives.‖207  He found 
that the FBI‘s methods had received ample acceptance outside of the FBI 
lab.
208
  The district court adopted the magistrate judge‘s report and 
recommendation and admitted the expert DNA testimony at trial, over 
Bonds‘s objection.209  The court reasoned that it could not examine Bonds‘s 
challenges relating to the accuracy of the DNA analysis results, but could only 
examine whether the government‘s expert testimony was based on generally 
accepted theories and procedures.
210
 
 
198. Id. at 558. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 563. 
201. Id. at 559. 
202. Id. at 562. 
203. Id. at 551. 
204. Id. at 556. 
205. Id. at 557. 
206. Id.  
207. Id. at 558–59. 
208. Id. at 560. 
209. Id. at 551. 
210. Id. at 563. 
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld 
the district court‘s decision to admit the evidence under Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
211
  In doing so, the court reasoned that the 
evidence that Bonds‘s DNA partially matched the DNA found in the crime 
scene sample was relevant to whether Bonds was present at the scene on the 
night of the murder and, therefore, helpful to the jury in determining whether 
he was guilty of the charges.
212
  More importantly, the court found that 
evidence credited by the district court established that the theory behind 
matching DNA and calculating false-match probabilities and the particular 
technique that the FBI lab employed could be tested by comparing the results 
generated from one set of samples with the results reached after repeating the 
matching and probability estimate process on control samples, concluding that 
it was ―irrelevant that there are other methods for DNA matching that could 
also be or have been tested.‖213  The court found that the FBI‘s principles and 
methodology had been tested by internal proficiency testing, validation 
studies, and environmental insult studies to determine whether the lab could 
produce reliable, reproducible results from samples that had been mixed with 
contaminants or subjected to environmental insults.
214
  The court concluded 
that it was ―clear that the FBI‘s theories, principles, methods, and techniques 
can be tested and have in fact been tested.‖215  The court found that ―the 
theory behind ‗matching‘ DNA itself and the general procedures used to come 
up with the forensic results clearly have received peer evaluation.‖216  While 
the court was ―troubl[ed]‖ by the FBI‘s deficiencies in calculating the rate of 
error and by the lack of external blind proficiency testing, it held that the other 
Daubert factors outweighed its concerns with the error rate because the 
general acceptance of the methodology in the scientific community implied 
that ―the rate of error is acceptable to the scientific community as well.‖217  
The court held: ―Disputes about specific techniques used or the accuracy of 
the results generated go to the weight, not the admissibility of the scientific 
evidence.‖218  The court further noted: ―[N]either newness nor lack of absolute 
certainty in a test suffices to render it inadmissible in court.  Every useful new 
development must have its first day in court.‖219  The court held that general 
 
211. Id. at 554.  The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Daubert between the trial and appeal 
in Bonds.  See id. at 554 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
212. Id. at 557. 
213. Id. at 558. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 559. 
216. Id. at 560. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 561. 
219. Id. (citation omitted). 
1106 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1073 
acceptance encompassed both the theory of DNA profiling and the FBI‘s 
methodology for conducting DNA testing.
220
  The court explained: 
[W]hile ordinarily the principles and procedures must be 
accepted by a majority of those in the pertinent scientific 
community, the absence of a majority does not necessarily 
rule out general acceptance.  The general acceptance test is 
designed only to uncover whether there is a general 
agreement of scientists in the field that [these] scientific data 
[are] not based on a novel theory or procedure that is ―mere 
speculation or conjecture.‖  In some instances, there may be 
several different theories or procedures used concerning one 
type of scientific evidence, all of which are generally 
accepted.  None may have the backing of the majority of 
scientists, yet the theory or procedure can still be generally 
accepted.  And even substantial criticism as to one theory or 
procedure will not be enough to find that the theory/procedure 
is not generally accepted.  Only when a theory or procedure 
does not have the acceptance of most of the pertinent 
scientific community, and in fact a substantial part of the 
scientific community disfavors the principle or procedure, 
will it not be generally accepted.
221
 
The court held that ―the degree of acceptance in the scientific community 
of the theory of DNA profiling and of the basic procedures used by the lab in 
this case is sufficient to meet the requirements . . . for general acceptance.‖222  
The court concluded: ―[G]eneral acceptance is required as to the principles 
and methodology employed.  The assessment of the validity and reliability of 
the conclusions drawn by the expert is a jury question; the judge may only 
examine whether the principles and methodology are scientifically valid and 
generally accepted.‖223  The court held that ―the Government experts‘ 
testimony was based on data and facts reasonably relied upon by experts in 
molecular biology and population genetics.‖224 
Following this blueprint, the lesson from Bonds is clear.  A proponent of 
expert testimony wanting the jury to enter an IVE and consider its contents as 
substantive evidence would need to lay the necessary foundation to establish 
the following: (1) the IVE was relevant to a material dispute in the case (e.g., 
the vantage point of an eyewitness or a party); (2) the field of IVE generally, 
and the expert witness‘s IVE protocols in particular, were generally accepted 
 
220. Id. at 562. 
221. Id. (citation omitted). 
222. Id. 
223. Id. at 563. 
224. Id. at 566. 
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among the relevant scientific community, presumably VR computer experts; 
(3) the expert witness had the ability to produce reliable and accurate IVEs 
without significant distortion; and (4) the IVE protocols and their accuracy 
had been scientifically validated and subjected to peer review, and there was 
some meaningful way to define and measure error within the IVEs created. 
The case of State v. Clark
225
 provides an example, in the context of 
computer-assisted crime scene reconstruction, of how these foundational 
requirements could be met.  Clark was charged with the murder of Tanya 
Banks, who died of a gunshot wound to the abdomen.
226
  Clark‘s defense was 
that Banks had accidentally shot herself.
227
  A forensic photographer and 
crime reconstructionist testified for the State about his reconstruction of the 
bathroom in which Banks was shot, which he generated using computer 
software that permitted him to rotate his reconstruction and look at it from 
different positions.
228
  For the purpose of reconstruction, the expert made 
assumptions about the bullet‘s trajectory and the position of Banks‘s body at 
the time of the shooting, based on information contained in the coroner‘s 
report, the physical evidence in the bathroom, and Banks‘s physical 
dimensions and posture.
229
  During his testimony, the expert used blown-up 
printouts of the computer-generated drawings of the bathroom to explain the 
results and conclusions of his report to the jury.
230
  The expert acknowledged 
that it was impossible to place Banks and the assailant in their exact positions 
at the time of the fatal shooting, but concluded that the accident scene was not 
consistent with a self-inflicted injury.
231
 
On appeal, Clark argued that the expert‘s testimony was not based upon 
sufficiently reliable grounds, in violation of Ohio‘s rule of evidence,232 which 
was substantially identical to its federal counterpart.
233
  The Ohio Eighth 
District Court of Appeals rejected Clark‘s argument, holding that the expert‘s 
testimony was sufficiently reliable.
234
  The court found that ―the field of crime 
scene reconstruction through the use of computer-generated simulations or 
computer-assisted drafting‖ had gained general acceptance.235  Accordingly, 
the expert testimony would assist the fact finder in the search for the truth, 
 
225. 655 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). 
226. Id. at 798–99. 
227. Id. at 799. 
228. Id. at 801. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. See id. at 801–02. 
232. Id. at 807–08. 
233. See FED. R. EVID. 702; OHIO R. EVID. 702. 
234. Clark, 655 N.E.2d at 813. 
235. Id. 
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and the danger of unfair prejudice to Clark was prevented by the State‘s 
timely disclosure of the expert‘s report and underlying data and Clark‘s 
opportunity to cross-examine the expert at trial.
236
 
Similarly, in Swinton, the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the 
admission of digitally enhanced photographs of bite marks after foundation 
for their authenticity had been provided by the State‘s expert in digital image 
enhancement.
237
  The court noted: 
First, [the expert witness] testified that the computer 
equipment is accepted as standard equipment in the field.  He 
testified that the Lucis program was relied upon by experts in 
the field of pattern analysis in a forensic setting.  He further 
testified that the program had been used in ―fingerprint 
pattern identification, bloodstain pattern identification, 
footwear and tire impression identification, and in bite mark 
identification.‖  Second, it was established that a qualified 
computer operator produced the enhancement.  [The expert 
witness‘s] testimony clearly demonstrated that he was well 
versed in the Lucis program.  He was a well trained and 
highly experienced forensic analyst, and he testified to his 
qualifications as an expert in the analysis of pattern evidence 
and the enhancement of that evidence . . . . 
Third, the state presented evidence that proper procedures 
were followed in connection with the input and output of 
information.  During direct examination, [the expert witness] 
testified accurately, clearly, and consistently regarding the 
process of the digitization of the image—wherein a 
photograph is transformed into pixels . . . —and how [he] 
then had used the Lucis software to select comparable points 
of contrast and array them into layers.  He also testified as to 
how the Lucis program then diminished certain layers in 
order to heighten the visual appearance of the bite mark. . . .  
Importantly, [the expert witness] compared the enhanced 
photographs with the unenhanced photographs in front of the 
jury. 
Fourth, the state adequately demonstrated that Lucis is a 
reliable software program.
238
 
If experts can attest to an adequate foundation for the reliability of the 
science on which proffered IVEs are based, courts should address the 
potential challenges that IVE exhibits create not by excluding those exhibits, 
 
236. Id. at 814. 
237. State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921, 943–44 (Conn. 2004). 
238. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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but rather by admitting them and educating the jury about the extent of 
acceptable interpretations.  Jurors can be taught to understand what computer 
scientists already understand: that IVEs are not ―snapshots‖ of the scenes that 
they represent, but rather highly mediated outputs of computer-science design, 
and that their probative value depends upon the nature of the mediations (i.e., 
the validity of the underlying theories, concepts, and principles that guide the 
translations from underlying data to final visual representation).  Jurors can be 
instructed to interpret IVEs in light of their context within the relevant 
computer-science discourse. 
Despite their epistemic risks, IVEs should not simply be excluded.  That 
jurors may require expert testimony to help them interpret IVEs is not a 
reason to exclude them.  The expert is the interpreter of the IVE.  Expert 
testimony will frame the IVE, from its authentication to the interpretation of 
its representations.  The foundation needed to authenticate the IVE, for 
example,
239
 will prompt jurors to focus on the model‘s mediated facets, and 
cross-examination should expose the limitations of the IVE to prove the fact 
at issue.  To presume otherwise is to presume that expert witnesses are unable 
to set forth the science clearly enough for jurors to comprehend it.
240
  When 
an expert‘s testimony accompanies an IVE in court, each makes the other 
more intelligible and persuasive and less misleading or unfairly prejudicial.  
The expert testimony and the IVE elucidate one another, maximizing the 
likelihood that the jury‘s factual findings will be based upon the most reliable 
science. 
VI.  JURY VIEW 
In addition to the foundational hurdles of establishing the accuracy, 
reliability, and authenticity of an IVE prior to its admission into evidence or 
―publication‖ to the jury, a party (or court) seeking to place a jury in an IVE 
 
239. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (stating that one form of authentication is ―showing that the 
process or system produces an accurate result‖). 
240. When expert scientific testimony is clearly presented, jurors largely attain a satisfactory 
level of comprehension and use the testimony appropriately to improve their findings and 
conclusions.  See, e.g., Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1174 (2000).  When jurors come to court with preconceived ideas that are 
incompatible with legal rules, they are more likely to follow the law rather than their preconceptions 
if those preconceptions are directly identified and addressed.  See generally Shari Seidman 
Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, 
and the Civil Jury, 26 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 513 (1992) (arguing that an active jury is more effective than 
a passive jury); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal 
Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 858 (1991); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior 
Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 507 (1993).  
It follows, then, that if jurors hold misconceptions about VR, recognizing and addressing those 
misconceptions through expert testimony reduces the likelihood that they will be driven by their 
misconceptions of what the images mean in rendering judgment. 
1110 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:1073 
as part of its fact-finding inquiry would face a larger and more conceptual 
hurdle: there has simply never been anything like it done in a jury trial before.  
Unlike its counterparts in continental Europe, the Anglo-American system of 
justice is adversarial, not inquisitorial.
241
  The presentation of evidence is 
driven almost entirely by the parties, through their attorneys.
242
  The judge is a 
―referee,‖ and the jury is merely a passive observer.243  Because of this 
adversarial structure, the use of IVEs, which would permit jurors sitting in a 
criminal trial to ―enter,‖ interact with, and manipulate a VR model 
themselves, is perhaps the most difficult use of VR technology to fit within 
traditional conceptions of the rules of evidence and the role of the jury.  In an 
IVE, jurors would be able to walk around the virtual scene and reach out and 
touch virtual objects.  As they were viewing the virtual scene, their perceptual 
feedback would be constantly updated. 
Nonetheless, permitting trial jurors to enter an IVE is not without 
precedent.  Despite the adversary nature of the criminal justice system, most, 
if not all, American jurisdictions have a procedure for a unique inquisitorial 
jury function—the jury view.244  Juries are often permitted to visit the scenes 
of crimes and accidents in the middle of trial,
245
 subject to the discretion of the 
trial judge,
246
 even when the scenes that the juries view are no longer in the 
same state that they were in at the time of the events in question.
247
  
 
241. Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod, Adversarial or Inquisitorial: Comparing 
Systems, in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 2 (Peter J. van Koppen & Steven D. Penrod eds., 2003). 
242. See id. at 3. 
243. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 131, 141 (1988) (explaining that juries are treated as ―passive 
recipients of information‖ and the judge as a ―master of ceremonies‖). 
244. See United States v. Passos-Paternina, 918 F.2d 979, 986 (1st Cir. 1990).  Federal courts 
recognize their authority to permit a jury view of places or objects outside of the courtroom as part of 
their inherent supervisory power over trial.  Id. 
245. See, e.g., Rhonda Cook, Jurors Stay Silent on Visit to Crime Scene, ATLANTA J. CONST., 
May 16, 2009, at A8 (discussing a murder trial jury‘s visit to the scene where the decedent‘s body 
was found).  The juries in music producer Phil Spector‘s two murder trials also toured his home in 
California, the alleged murder scene.  Jury Tours Phil Spector‘s Los Angeles Home, Telegraph on 
the Web, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/celebritynews/4701976/Jury-
tours-Phil-Spectors-Los-Angeles-home.html. 
While historically there was a split among jurisdictions, almost all jurisdictions today consider a 
jury viewing of a crime scene or other location to constitute the receipt of ―evidence.‖  See, e.g., 
People v. Bush, 10 P. 169, 173–75 (Cal. 1886); 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT 
COMMON LAW § 1168 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1972). 
246. United States v. Pettiford, 962 F.2d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 1992); Casias v. United States, 302 
F.2d 513, 514 (10th Cir. 1962); Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Kelley, 131 F.2d 627, 628 
(5th Cir. 1942); Van De Putte v. Cameron County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 7, 
35 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (permitting the jury to view the premises in dispute). 
247. See, e.g., Dickson v. Yale Univ., 105 A.2d 463, 464–65 (Conn. 1954) (upholding the trial 
court‘s permission allowing the jury to view the premises of an accident that occurred when Dickson 
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Generally, the scene has been altered through the process of crime scene 
investigation and preservation, accident reconstruction, or merely the passage 
of time.
248
  It has been cleaned up, and crucial evidence has been removed for 
laboratory analysis.  For example, in a homicide case, the body of the 
decedent will certainly have been removed so that an autopsy can be 
performed, biological evidence will have been removed for DNA analysis, the 
murder weapon will have been removed for ballistics analysis, and so on.  
Juries generally do not even visit scenes at the same time of day or under the 
same conditions as when the alleged crime was committed or the accident 
occurred.
249
  Nonetheless, despite these distortions, the common law 
recognizes that the probative value of an on-site view of the scene outweighs 
the potential unfair prejudice or jury confusion that may result from an 
imperfect facsimile of the scene and leaves to argument by the parties the 
weight that the jury should place on the imperfections.
250
  Juries have been 
permitted to view a scene by going to the scene of the crime or accident and 
investigating it themselves, if doing so would aid them in reaching a correct 
result,
251
 as long as the scene remains in a substantially similar condition as it 
 
fell off of a balcony without a guardrail even though the jury could have seen that a guardrail had 
subsequently been installed). 
248. See generally Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (holding that the negligent 
failure of the police to refrigerate the victim‘s clothing and to perform tests on semen samples during 
a child molestation investigation did not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of bad 
faith). 
For example, in the infamous O.J. Simpson murder trial, jurors were permitted to view 
Simpson‘s home to illustrate testimony regarding his bloody socks that were allegedly recovered 
there, even though the socks, of course, were no longer at the scene at the time of the viewing.  See 
Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the 
O.J. Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 309–11 (1998).  In addition, the jury was permitted 
to the view the scene after Simpson‘s attorneys had altered the decor by replacing multiple pictures 
of white women (including a nude picture of Simpson‘s white girlfriend) with pictures depicting 
African-Americans (including a famous Norman Rockwell painting depicting a black schoolgirl 
being escorted to a recently desegrated school by National Guard troops).  Id.; George Fisher, The 
O.J. Simpson Corpus, 49 STAN. L. REV. 971, 978 (1997). 
249. See, e.g., Rau v. Redwood City Woman‘s Club, 245 P.2d 12, 17 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) 
(―The mere fact that changes have occurred at the scene of an accident does not necessarily prevent a 
view of the scene by the jury.‖); Miller v. Anchor Cas. Co., 45 N.W.2d 705, 708 (Minn. 1951) 
(―[T]he possibility that a view will aid the jury in understanding the evidence in these actions cannot 
be precluded merely because some period of time has transpired since the accident occurred.‖). 
250. See Rau, 245 P.2d at 17. 
251. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1119 (2004); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.50 (2002) 
(providing that a court may permit the jury, prior to closing argument, to view or observe the crime 
scene or any other premises or place involved in the case when doing so would be helpful to the jury 
in determining any material fact at issue); WASH. CRIM. R. 6.9 (giving a trial court discretion to 
permit the jury to view the crime scene); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-502 (2009) (―When the court 
considers it proper that the jury view any place or personal property pertinent to the case, it will order 
the jury to be conducted in a body . . . to view the place or personal property . . . .‖); see also 
People v. King, 534 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a crime scene can be 
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was in at the time of the alleged crime or accident.
252
  A few courts have 
permitted jury views that were ―interactive‖ in nature.253 
The purpose of permitting a jury to view the scene is to enable it better to 
understand and apply the evidence produced in court.
254
  As the Appellate 
Division of the New York Supreme Court has explained: 
It is a well-understood fact that an individual familiar with the 
locality can better and more accurately understand the 
testimony of the witnesses describing scenes occurring 
therein than a stranger who is dependent entirely upon the 
description given by the witnesses.  A criminal trial is to 
ascertain the facts . . . .
255
 
If anything, an IVE created to simulate the scene of a crime or accident so 
that the jury can virtually view it would be a more accurate way to reconstruct 
the scene as it was at the time of the events in question, since the IVE could 
simulate the time of day, presence of the physical evidence, and so on, in a 
way that the actual scene, stripped of much of its material evidence prior to 
jury viewing, could not.
256
  Perhaps the greatest danger presented by a live 
view of a crime or accident scene is the risk that extraneous, irrelevant, or 
unfairly prejudicial information would reach the jury, either in the form of 
communication or comments by one of those present at the scene, or 
inappropriate sights seen by jurors.
257
  Because IVEs can be designed with 
―gaze-directed‖ steering techniques and ―locked‖ fields of view, which 
prevent lateral head movements, they can restrict jurors to a literal ―three-
 
viewed by the jury as long as it is told of the changes). 
252. See People v. White, 416 N.Y.S.2d 260, 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (citation omitted), 
rev’d on other grounds by New York v. White, 421 N.E.2d 825, 827 (1981); cf. People v. Postell, 
629 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that the trial court properly exercised its 
discretion in permitting the jury to view the crime scene even though a scaffolding had been removed 
since the murder because ―the jury could easily reconstruct the exact scene‖ and the viewing was 
―helpful to the jury in assisting it to determine what the eyewitnesses to the crime saw and heard‖). 
253. See, e.g., Newman v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 262 P.2d 95, 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1953) (upholding a trial court‘s decision to permit a jury view of a streetcar that included a 
demonstration of the functioning of its door); State v. O‘Day, 175 So. 838, 842 (La. 1937) 
(upholding the trial court‘s decision to permit witnesses to testify at a jury view of a crime scene); 
Tarr v. Keller Lumber & Const. Co., 144 S.E. 881, 883 (W. Va. 1928) (upholding the trial court‘s 
decision to permit the jury to view a power saw in operation). 
254. State v. Gone, 587 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Mont. 1978); State v. Land, 851 P.2d 678, 682 
(Wash. 1993). 
255. White, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 262 (citation omitted). 
256. However, this decision would remain discretionary with the trial judge.  Thompson v. 
South Carolina Highway Dep‘t, 70 S.E.2d 241, 243–44 (S.C. 1952) (upholding a trial court decision 
that the availability of photographic evidence rendered a jury view undesirable). 
257. See, e.g., People v. Stanley, 665 N.E.2d 190, 191 (N.Y. 1996) (finding reversible error 
after jurors conducted an experiment at the crime scene). 
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dimensional tour‖ of the scene, ensuring that each juror gets the exact same 
optic flow as any other,
258
 as opposed to a live scene view, where each juror 
can look anywhere that she wants in the scene, and not all jurors leave having 
viewed the same scene. 
One of the original rationales for the admissibility of crime scene 
photographs into evidence was that they were an improved but functional 
equivalent of a crime scene viewing by the jury.
259
  The case of Mardoff v. 
State
260
 is an example.  Mardoff was convicted of the murder of his wife by 
stabbing her twenty times in bed.
261
  On appeal, Mardoff challenged the 
introduction into evidence of gruesome photographs of his dead wife, with the 
weapon still embedded in her body.
262
  In the photographs she appeared as she 
did when she was discovered by the police when they entered the crime scene 
on the night of the murder: propped up against the wall between the foot of 
the bed and a bookcase standing nearby.
263
  Four of the photographs were 
taken of the room in which the murder was committed and the body found 
before the body was moved, and the fifth was taken without any 
rearrangement of any of the objects in the room except that the body had been 
lifted from the wall, exposing the hilt of a Chinese dagger protruding from the 
victim‘s back, to show how the weapon that caused the death had been 
plunged into the victim‘s back and left there.264  Rejecting Mardoff‘s 
challenge, the Florida Supreme Court explained: 
The value of a pictorial representation of the scene of a 
crime is obvious.  From the very nature of the crime of 
homicide it is not possible for the trial jury to view the 
premises before physical appearance of the scene is changed 
by removal of the victim‘s body.  It is common knowledge 
 
258. This ―locking‖ is analogous to the redaction of physical exhibits, often performed by the 
old-fashioned media of black pen and photocopier. 
259. See Thompson, 70 S.E.2d at 243.  Similarly, courts admitted newly discovered X-rays into 
evidence relatively quickly based on the rationale that they were a specialized category of 
conventional photography and, therefore, illustrative aides to medical testimony.  See Golan, Silent 
Witness, supra note 185, at 474–77; W.W. Goodrich, The Legal Status of the X-Ray, in 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE MEDICAL SOCIETY OF NEW YORK 235 (1904); Edward C. Halperin, X-Rays 
at the Bar, 1896–1910, 23 INVESTIGATIVE RADIOLOGY 639 (1988); Orlando F. Scott, 
Röntgenograms and their Chronological Legal Recognition, 24 ILL. L. REV. 674, 676 (1930).  See, 
e.g., Miller v. Dumon, 64 P. 804, 805 (Wash. 1901) (―[T]here would seem to be no reason for 
making a distinction between an X-ray and a common photograph; that is, either is admissible as 
evidence when verified by proof that it is a true representation of an object which is the subject of 
inquiry.‖). 
260. 196 So. 625 (Fla. 1940). 
261. Id. at 626. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
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that the descriptions given by witnesses, however 
conscientious, who have observed the body of a murdered 
person and the surroundings will vary often to a surprising 
degree.  No better way has so far been devised to show the 
scene of a homicide than a photograph taken before the body 
of the deceased and the objects near or around it have been 
disturbed. 
The admissibility of such evidence must be determined 
by the trial judge after an inquiry as to whether the objects 
appearing in the picture are in the same position as when the 
crime was discovered to preclude fabrication of testimony, for 
a picture of the reconstruction of the crime would be harmful 
in the same degree that the true representation would be 
helpful to the jury in comprehending the real conditions of the 
place where the crime was committed.
265
 
This rationale seems equally, if not more, applicable to the use of VR 
technology to simulate immersive scenes for juries. 
The portrayal of scene evidence has followed a somewhat linear 
progression: live viewing, drawings, black-and-white photographs, color 
photographs, video recording, and, now, VR simulation.  There is no reason 
why IVE technology should be subjected to any different or more strenuous 
threshold for admissibility than any other representational medium.
266
  As the 
Florida Supreme Court explained in rejecting a challenge to the then-new 
technology of color photography: 
We feel that the rule regulating the admissibility of 
pictures has been settled and that there is no occasion further 
to pursue it except to the point that it might be varied by the 
use of prints in color.  The argument that there should be a 
distinction seems to us specious for the accuracy of a print 
should be enhanced by the natural color of the objects 
depicted . . . . 
 
265. Id. at 626–27; see Adams v. State, 10 So. 106, 107 (Fla. 1891) (―A map, diagram, or 
picture, whether made by the hand of man or by photography, verified as a correct representation of  
physical objects about which testimony is offered . . . is admissible in evidence . . . to enable the jury 
to better understand the case.‖). 
266. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 1992) 
(―[W]e treat computer-generated models or simulations like other scientific tests, and condition 
admissibility on a sufficient showing that: (1) the computer is functioning properly; (2) the input and 
underlying equations are sufficiently complete and accurate . . . ; and (3) the program is generally 
accepted by the appropriate community of scientists.‖). 
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Our conclusion is that the test in judging admissibility is 
one of relevancy and that there is no reason to apply a 
separate and distinct rule to pictures in color.
267
 
VII.  THE VIRTUAL CRIME SCENE 
In the context of a criminal case, there are two additional advantages that 
an IVE re-creation of a crime scene would have over a live jury viewing or 
other representational evidence.  First, an IVE could be controlled in a way 
that could eliminate certain Rule 403 concerns without diminishing the 
probative value of the evidence.  One substantial area of litigation in criminal 
jury trials has to do with the gruesome details that are often inherent in 
representational media—autopsy photographs, blood spatter patterns, and 
ballistics and weapons analysis.
268
  An IVE simulating the crime scene could 
be constructed that would permit a sufficiently, if not more, accurate view of 
the crime scene and its pertinent details (the position of the body, the location 
where the weapon was discovered, the fatal wounds) without the blood and 
guts of video and still photographs.
269
 
Second, the use of an IVE representing the events in question, created by 
a VR expert after consultation with the defense team or review of pretrial 
discovery materials, might provide a vehicle for a criminal defendant to 
introduce evidence of her version of events before the jury and permit the jury 
to test that version of events without the defendant having to waive her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  For example, imagine a 
murder prosecution where the defense is mistaken self-defense.  The 
defendant is claiming that she shot someone in an alley that she believed was 
attacking her, when in fact the person was in the alley for innocent reasons 
unrelated to the defendant.  The primary issue at trial is the reasonableness of 
the defendant‘s mistaken belief.  Ordinarily, for the jury to assess whether the 
 
267. Wilkins v. State, 155 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 1963). 
268. A judge may exclude evidence under Rule 403 if ―its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.‖  FED. 
R. EVID. 403.  For a discussion on the impact of gruesome evidence on jury decision making, see 
David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and 
Jury Decision-Making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183, 184–89 (2006).  See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 973 
So. 2d 380, 393 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Matthews v. State, 99 S.W.3d 403, 405 (Ark. 2003); People 
v. Hoyos, 162 P.3d 528, 555 (Cal. 2007); State v. Satchwell, 710 A.2d 1348, 1362 (Conn. 1998); 
State v. Warledo, 190 P.3d 937, 951 (Kan. 2008); Fields v. Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 375, 411 
(Ky. 2008); State v. Lee, 645 N.W.2d 459, 468 (Minn. 2002); State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85, 134 
(N.J. 1991); State v. Williams, 565 S.E.2d 609, 653 (N.C. 2002); State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 639 
(Ohio 2006); Stouffer v. State, 147 P.3d 245, 268 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003); Prible v. State, 175 
S.W.3d 724, 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); State v. Calliham, 57 P.3d 220, 231 (Utah 2002). 
269. In this sense, the use of an IVE instead of a live scene viewing would be analogous to 
redacting the gory details from photographs depicting the scenes of crimes or accidents, autopsies, 
and so on.  See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 43–44 (1st Cir. 2007). 
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defendant‘s mistake was reasonable, the defendant, as a practical matter, 
would have to take the stand and testify to her recollection and perception of 
the events for the jury to see the alley through her eyes, placing her credibility 
at issue and subjecting herself to all of the inherent risks of testimony—being 
under oath, subject to cross-examination;
270
 opening the door to the 
introduction of highly prejudicial information, like evidence of her prior bad 
acts, convictions, and inconsistent statements,
271
 or evidence that is otherwise 
inadmissible;
272
 or undercutting the jury‘s ability to apply the presumption of 
innocence and burden of proof.
273
  With an IVE, a VR expert could generate 
an IVE, taking into account all parties‘ versions of events, permitting the jury 
to see the alley through the defendant‘s eyes without the inherent risks 
entailed with the waiver of her Fifth Amendment privilege through live 
 
270. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal 
Rules that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 868–69 (2008) (discussing the 
value of hearing from the defendant and the way that a criminal defendant‘s decision to testify 
exposes her to cross-examination with otherwise inadmissible evidence—―a vigorous rhetorical 
challenge to any perceived inconsistencies or inaccuracies in the defendant‘s testimony‖). 
271. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (prohibiting the introduction of evidence of a defendant‘s prior 
bad acts to prove action in conformity therewith); FED. R. EVID. 608(b) (permitting impeachment of 
a testifying witness with evidence of prior bad acts); FED. R. EVID 609 (permitting impeachment of a 
testifying witness with evidence of prior convictions); FED. R. EVID 613 (permitting impeachment of 
a testifying witness with evidence of prior inconsistent statements); see generally FED. R. EVID. 609 
advisory committee‘s notes (―[I]n virtually every case in which prior convictions are used to impeach 
the testifying defendant, the defendant faces a unique risk of prejudice—i.e., the danger that 
convictions that would be excluded under FED. R. EVID 404 will be misused by a jury as propensity 
evidence despite their introduction solely for impeachment purposes.‖); Margaret Meriwether 
Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of Impeaching the Nontestifying Declarant, 56 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 495, 508 (1995) (―The danger that the jury will misuse evidence of a defendant‘s prior record 
is a real one, and the prejudice arising from misuse is substantial.‖); Alan D. Hornstein, Between 
Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. 
REV. 1, 1–2 (1997) (―Typically, the defendant may keep the jury from learning of prior convictions 
only by waiving the right to testify.‖); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal 
Defendants, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 419 (1980) (noting the impossibility of a jury separating 
character evidence introduced to impeach a defendant‘s credibility from its knowledge of the 
defendant‘s character as applied to the determination of guilt or innocence).  But see FED. R. EVID. 
806 (permitting the impeachment of the credibility of a nontestifying hearsay declarant in the manner 
as if the declarant had testified). 
272. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990) (permitting a testifying criminal 
defendant to be impeached with evidence obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627–28 (1980) (permitting a testifying criminal 
defendant to be impeached with evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even if the 
defendant‘s direct-examination testimony did not implicate the illegally seized evidence, as long as 
the subject was ―reasonably suggested by the defendant‘s direct examination‖); Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U.S. 714, 721–22 (1975) (permitting a testifying criminal defendant to be impeached with evidence 
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
273. Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment 
to the Innocent One, 78 GEO. L.J. 1, 19 (1989). 
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testimony.
274
  Presumably, this is precisely what the defense in Harris was 
attempting to do with its rejected VR simulation—show the jury what the 
parking lot looked like from behind the wheel of the Mercedes in a more 
reliable and less risky way than having Harris testify about what she saw. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In any given trial, there may be legitimate concerns about the reliability 
and accuracy of employing an IVE to reconstruct the scene of an accident or 
crime.  Some of the essential questions educed by the baseline assumptions 
underlying the creation and interpretation of IVEs recommend a cautious 
strategy to their use during jury trials.  Assuming, however, that foundational 
testimony satisfied the ordinary standards for admissibility, the law should not 
react to the challenges raised by the use of IVEs with juries by categorically 
excluding them.  Instead, courts should allow the use of IVEs (in appropriate 
cases) while endeavoring to improve jurors‘ virtual literacy so that their 
findings of fact and legal judgments will be facilitated by the best available 
computer technology. 
Concerns with distortion and manipulation are not unique to IVEs.  Still 
photographs can be doctored in ways that render the changes undetectable.  
These types of concerns with IVE models could be addressed through 
thorough pretrial discovery, particularly of the bases for the construction of 
the model, under the existing rules of criminal and civil procedure.
275
  Some 
concerns could also be addressed with limiting instructions to the jury,
276
 
including instructions as to weight that the jury should place on its 
observations within an IVE.  If the different sources of information upon 
which an IVE model is built are questionable or unreliable, those unreliable 
sources could be explored by the opponent of the IVE model on cross-
examination or even, ultimately, become grounds to challenge the use of an 
individual IVE model in a particular case,
277
 but such concerns do not warrant 
 
274. One non-courtroom example of the possibilities for using VR technology to develop more 
accurate understandings of past events is the VR simulation ―JFK: Reloaded,‖ which uses IVE 
technology to place participants in the role of Lee Harvey Oswald, John F. Kennedy, Jr.‘s assassin, in 
a mass-participation forensic reconstruction of the events to determine whether Lee Harvey Oswald 
could have acted alone.  Had such technology been available in 1963, Oswald‘s defense team could 
have deployed it to advance an alternate theory of the crime. 
275. Presumably, an IVE model of crime or accident scene would be constructed primarily 
with reference to video and photographic recordings, witness statements, and physical evidence. 
276. See, e.g., Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 225 P.2d 497, 502 (Cal. 1950) (holding that permitting 
a jury to view the scene of an accident on a hotel roof after substantial changes had been made was 
not error because the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the changes in reaching its 
verdict). 
277. For example, if an expert computer witness constructed an IVE model, at least in part, on 
the basis of partisan witness statements, and if changing the contents of the witness statements would 
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excluding an entire medium from jury trials.  Certainly, if a particular IVE 
model would be of little assistance to a jury and its potential for misuse, delay, 
or confusion of the issues were great or it were cumulative of other evidence 
presented, a court would have the discretion to deny its admission under Rule 
403. 
While the use of an IVE during a jury trial may seem like a foreign 
invasion into the traditional American adversary judicial system, it can also be 
viewed as merely another point along a line of technological progression, 
from scene viewing to photography to video evidence to virtual evidence.  
Employing an IVE during trial would be no different in substance than the 
admission of other types of testimonial, photographic, and demonstrative 
evidence that courts have permitted for decades.  Many of the concerns with 
the use of an IVE during a jury trial (distortion, reliability, authenticity) are 
the same concerns that were raised when photographic (and later video) 
evidence of crime and accident scenes first began to be introduced during jury 
trials.  Ultimately, those objections were overcome by comparing and 
analogizing the photographic evidence to the more traditional practice of the 
jury viewing the scene.  Today, no one doubts the admissibility of a crime 
scene photograph or video, as long as it is a fair and accurate representation of 
the scene that it seeks to capture.  On the contrary, contemporaneous 
photographs and videos are often admitted into evidence as more accurate 
alternatives to a visit to the (subsequently altered) scene by the jury.  In the 
same vein, IVE technology used to re-create a scene is simply an even more 
advanced and accurate way of helping the jury to weigh and evaluate witness 
testimony and other evidence.  As such, the advantages of its use far exceed 
the disadvantages. 
Much has been written about the epistemic underpinnings of the rules of 
evidence—to wit, that the central function of a trial is to discover the truth and 
that accuracy is a measure of the proximity to or likelihood of the truth.
278
  
 
change the resulting model in a way that benefited the opposing party, such information would 
certainly affect the weight that the jury would give to the model and the expert‘s opinion about it.  
This process would be no different than if a psychiatrist retained by a party in a civil or criminal case 
gave an expert psychiatric opinion on the basis of information provided directly by the party and an 
assumption that such information was accurate and truthful. 
278. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (noting that the 
―basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth‖); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 
(1933) (―The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest—if they are to rest upon 
reason—is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.‖); R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 
3 S.C.R. 1197, 1206 (Can.) (stating that ascertaining the truth is ―[t]he ultimate aim of any trial, 
criminal or civil‖); R. v. Levogiannis, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, 483 (Can.) (stating that ―[t]he goal of the 
court process is truth seeking‖); R. v. Howard, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1337, 1360 (Can.) (emphasizing ―the 
commitment of courts of justice to the ascertainment of the truth‖); ERNEST GELLNER, 
LEGITIMATION OF BELIEF 27 (1974); H.L. HO, A PHILOSOPHY OF EVIDENCE LAW: JUSTICE IN THE 
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They are why the rules of evidence entertain a strong presumption in favor of 
the admissibility of relevant evidence.
279
  Periodically, the development of a 
new technology forces the judicial system to rethink those epistemological 
questions.
280
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to place jurors in the position of the parties and witnesses to the circumstances 
surrounding a disputed event.
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reasonable limitations and the ability of a proponent to establish the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, the interests of truth are advanced by allowing 
the parties, or even the court, to employ an IVE during a jury trial. 
 
